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Abstract
In the first essay, I examine how the threat of activist intervention affects firm
innovation. I argue that when firm managers pursue innovation, firm stock price
may reflect less precise information about the firm’s fundamental value, which
makes firm managers vulnerable to shareholder intervention. Under the threat of
shareholder intervention, managers will be biased against innovation projects to
minimize their job termination risk. Consistent with this mechanism, I find that:
(1) increasing the threat of shareholder intervention has a significant and eco-
nomically important negative impact on firm innovation; (2) the threat of share-
holder intervention exerts less negative effects on firms that are more likely to
have efficient stock prices (e.g., firms with more monitoring institutional investors
and/or more financial analysts). To establish causality, I use a novel identifica-
tion strategy that relies on a quasi-natural experiment of activist fund closures to
generate exogenous variation in the level of shareholder intervention threat. The
difference-in-differences estimates show that firm-level innovation significantly im-
proves following exogenous activist fund closures. The results from this identifi-
cation strategy suggest a negative causal effect of shareholder intervention threat
on firm innovation.
In the second essay, I examine the effects of shareholder derivative litigation on
board effectiveness. Specifically, I investigate the effects of Delaware’s judicially-
led reforms in 2003. In response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Delaware courts
adjusted their corporate law jurisprudence, moving to a more restrictive applica-
iii
tion of the business judgment rule and more vigorous enforcement of officer and
director fiduciary duties. By lowering the procedural hurdles to derivative liti-
gation (e.g., demand requirement, and special litigation committee), the courts
allowed more shareholder derivative lawsuits to survive pretrial motions to dis-
miss. These reforms have greatly enhanced the ability of shareholders to effec-
tively pursue derivative litigation against corporate directors and officers. Using
a sample of 2153 publicly-traded firms from 1999 to 2007 and the difference-in-
differences method, I find that following the 2003 reforms, Delaware chartered cor-
porations have exhibited higher CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and greater
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than have non-Delaware firms. These re-
sults show that empowering shareholders to pursue derivative litigation provides
high-powered incentives to directors to improve their corporate governance deci-
sions.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Beginning with Berle and Means (1932), agency problems that arise from the
separation of ownership and control have become a prominent research area. It
has been argued that managers act in their own self-interest, and they may make
decisions that conflict with the best interests of the shareholders. Economists
have attempted to identify the corporate governance systems that can constrain
managers’ opportunistic behaviors. Recent research shows that large institutional
investors can play a critical role in corporate governance. Institutional investors,
such as mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds, have sizable ownership in
public-traded firms, which provides them incentives to bear the cost of monitoring
managers. In addition, these institutional investors are highly skilled and well-
resourced professional shareholders who may have the power to effect changes in
corporate governance practice.
Prior literature shows that institutional investors can exert governance through
three main mechanisms. The first is shareholder intervention (also known as
“voice”), which includes conducting proxy contests, voting against management
proposals, or suggesting a strategic change via a public shareholder proposal (e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995;
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988). The second
mechanism for shareholders to exert governance is disciplinary trading (also known
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as “exit” and “Wall Street Walk”), where shareholders sell a company’s shares,
pushing down the stock price (e.g., Parrino, Sias and Starks, 2003; Admati and
Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009). Prior research examines the incentives and
choices of institutional investors to use intervention vs. trading, and the inter-
action effects of these mechanisms (e.g., Kahn and Winton, 1998; Maug, 1998;
Edmans and Manso, 2011).
Although most of the research on shareholder governance focused on interven-
tion and disciplinary trading, a recent literature has started to examine a new
governance mechanism: shareholder litigation. Shareholders can sue directors
and managers for breach of fiduciary duties. There is increasing evidence that the
threat of shareholder lawsuits changes director and manager behavior (e.g., Ferris
et al., 2007; Becker and Strömberg, 2012; Appel, 2015).
My dissertation examines the roles of institutional investors in corporate gov-
ernance, with a focus on the mechanisms of shareholder direct intervention and
shareholder litigation. In Chapter 2, I investigate how the threat of shareholder in-
tervention affects firm incentives to pursue innovation. Over the past two decades,
shareholder activism has become a mainstream activity that can be initiated with
a modest investment stake. Activist investors, such as Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz,
and Bill Ackman have achieved notable success in obtaining board seats, pressur-
ing companies to return extra cash through dividends or share buybacks, or forcing
the exploration of a sale of the company. My research examines activist institu-
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tional investors, and evaluates their impact on firm technological innovation. My
main finding is that the threat of activist intervention discourages publicly-traded
firms from pursuing innovation. I argue that in publicly-traded firms, shareholder
intervention often is contingent on the information reflected in stock prices. When
firm managers pursue innovation, stock prices may incorporate less accurate in-
formation about the value of the innovation projects. When the stock price is
undervalued, firm managers are vulnerable to activist intervention. So, when ac-
tivist investors are present, firm managers may prefer conventional projects and
forgo valuable innovation projects. I empirically evaluate the impact of the threat
of activist intervention on firm innovation outcomes.
Chapter 3 is focused on the mechanism of shareholder litigation. I investi-
gate whether litigation rights have an impact on director incentives and behavior.
I argue that shareholder litigation can severely damage director reputation and
career opportunities. Although directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O
insurance) can protect directors against legal liability, directors still concern them-
selves with the reputation outcome of lawsuits. Thus, the threat of shareholder
litigation can motivate directors to take effort to effectively monitor firm man-
agement. I examine a legal event that has dramatically changed the firm litiga-
tion environment. In 2003, Delaware judiciary reformed its state corporate law,
increasing scrutiny of director liability for breach of fiduciary duty. The reforms
have enhanced the ability of shareholders to pursue derivative litigation. My study
3
shows that the threat of shareholder litigation improves board effectiveness when
making decisions on CEO compensation and replacement. This study provides
evidence that derivative litigation has economically important effects on director
incentives and corporate governance practice.
An important challenge in the empirical research on corporate governance is
the presence of endogeneity issues, such as unobservable heterogeneity and simul-
taneity. The endogeneity problem may lead to biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates. In Chapter 2, when examining the effects of activist investors on firm
innovation, the threat of activist intervention might be endogenous. It is possible
that less innovative firms may attract more activist institutional investors and,
thus, face a higher level of intervention threat. In Chapter 3, when I examine
the effects of shareholder litigation on board of director incentives, the threat of
shareholder litigation is endogenous, because poorly-performing boards are more
likely to be sued by shareholders. To address the endogeneity problem, I use
quasi-natural experiments to generate exogenous changes in the threat of activist
intervention and in the threat of shareholder litigation.
In Chapter 2, I employ a natural experiment of activist investor fund closures.
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, a large portion of activist institutional in-
vestors closed their businesses. The main reason for these fund closures is that
market-wide liquidity shocks caused dramatic declines in activist hedge fund per-
formance. A main strategy of activist hedge funds is to force the target firms
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into a takeover. During the financial crisis, this strategy became unprofitable and
difficult to implement as the global merger and acquisition market plummeted.
The closure of activist funds is an exogenous event, because the closure decisions
are unlikely to be driven by the information on firm innovation performance. I
hypothesize that these closure events cause a decline in the threat of activist in-
tervention facing the publicly-traded firms. I utilize the difference-in-differences
method, and test how firm innovation changed following the exogenous activist
fund closures. I find that firm innovation significantly increases following the ex-
ogenous decrease in the threat of activist intervention. Using the activist fund
closures as a natural experiment, I address the reverse causality concerns, and
provide evidence for the causal effect of the threat of activist intervention on firm
innovation.
In Chapter 3, I use Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003 as a quasi-natural
experiment. This event generated state-level change in the threat of shareholder
litigation. The main reason for Delaware’s reform is the threat of federal preemp-
tion. Delaware has a prominent role in American corporate law, as more than
50% of publicly-traded companies in the United States are incorporated in the
State of Delaware. Before the Enron scandal, Delaware built a reputation as the
most management-friendly state. After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Delaware courts were mindful of the preemptive threat of federal legislation, and
the possibility that uniform federal standards could erode Delaware’s advantage in
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incorporation business. In response, Delaware courts took the initiative to reform
the state corporate law. They imposed stricter judicial standards for evaluating
director and officer fiduciary duties. They lowered the procedural hurdles that
blocked derivative litigation (e.g., the demand requirement, and special litigation
committee). They liberalized Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which permits shareholders to inspect corporate books and records to build
“particularized facts” for pleading demand futility. Together, these reforms em-
powered shareholders to pursue derivative litigation. Importantly, Delaware’s re-
forms occurred at the state level and, thus, are exogenous to individual firm’s
governance practice. Using this quasi-natural experiment, I can make causal in-
ference about whether shareholder litigation rights have an impact on corporate
governance.
In sum, this dissertation examines the roles of institutional investors in exer-
cising corporate governance. I examine the “direct intervention” mechanism, and
show that the threat of activist intervention has a negative impact on corporate
innovation. I also investigate the “shareholder litigation” mechanism. I find that
litigation rights can be an effective tool for institutional investors to exert gover-
nance. Empowering shareholders in their litigation rights has a positive impact
on board of director effectiveness in performing their monitoring functions.
Future research may examine the joint effects of various governance mechanisms
of institutional investors. Most prior research has studied the governance mech-
6
anisms independently. I am interested in examining how the various shareholder
governance mechanisms (e.g., intervention, disciplinary trading, and litigation) in-
teract with each other, and how the effectiveness of corporate governance is jointly
determined by these governance mechanisms. Moreover, it would be fruitful to
study different types of institutional investors (e.g. index funds, activist funds).
Given they have their own private benefits, they may disagree in certain corporate
governance policies. It would be interesting to know how various types of investors
coordinate and resolve conflicts in the process of corporate governance. Another
potential avenue for future research is to investigate how institutional investors
and other major players, such as boards of directors, employees, and labor unions,
interact in the decision process of governance. I believe that research in these
areas will greatly improve our knowledge of corporate governance.
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Chapter 2
The Threat of Shareholder Intervention and
Firm Innovation
2.1. Introduction
In the past two decades, an important feature of corporate governance reform is
the growing shift from a director-centric to a more shareholder-centric governance
system. The rule changes of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have
greatly empowered shareholders to exert influence or control over board elections,
management compensation, and major business strategies. Firm management is
now facing an increasing intervention threat from shareholders, especially activist
shareholders. The Economist (February 7, 2015) estimates that, “since the end
of 2009, 15% of the members of the S&P 500 index of America’s biggest firms
have faced an activist campaign...[and] about 50% of S&P 500 firms have had an
activist on their share register.” How does this important change in the corporate
governance landscape affect corporate long-term investment, and in particular,
firm innovation? My research examines this question by constructing a theoreti-
cal framework that explains managers’ incentives under the threat of shareholder
intervention and by empirically documenting the economic impact of intervention
threat on firm innovation.
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) theorize that shareholder control con-
stitutes an expropriation threat that ex ante reduces managerial incentives and
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non-contractible, firm-specific investment. Shareholder control that enables share-
holders to reverse managers’ investment decisions, reduces the private benefits that
managers can obtain from exerting effort and initiating profitable projects. My re-
search extends Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi by examining a new mechanism that
is based on contingent control of shareholders. In today’s publicly-traded firms,
the exercise of shareholder control is often contingent on the information reflected
in stock prices. Relying on stock prices as a public signal of a firm’s performance is
rooted in the theory that stock prices aggregate information from various market
participants and, thus, provide valuable guidance (Hayek, 1945; Grossman, 1976;
Roll, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). If shareholder intervention is based on
the information contained in stock prices, the information efficiency of stock prices
is key to determining shareholder intervention and managerial incentives.
Prior literature shows that pursuing innovation increases information asymme-
try between corporate insiders and outside investors, because firm managers are of-
ten reluctant to disclose innovation-related information to the market, and unique-
ness of the innovation project makes it difficult for outside investors to precisely
determine the value of the project (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Maksimovic
and Pichler, 2001; Aboody and Lev, 2000). Recent research provides evidence
that, for firms with greater information asymmetry, stock prices are less efficient
in incorporating value-relevant information. For example, Kelly and Ljungqvist
(2012) empirically demonstrate that stock prices fall substantially as a firm’s in-
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formation asymmetry increases. Thus, pursuing innovation is associated with less
precise information reflected in stock prices. When shareholder intervention deci-
sions are based on the information contained in stock prices, the reduction in price
informativeness will increase the likelihood of shareholder intervention. Since firm
managers are inclined to minimize job termination risk, managers under share-
holder intervention threat will be biased against innovation projects. Therefore, I
propose that the threat of shareholder intervention negatively affects firm manager
innovation incentives.
To empirically evaluate the economic impact of shareholder intervention threat
on firm innovation, I construct a sample of 2,097 U.S. publicly-traded firms from
2001 to 2008. The threat of shareholder intervention is measured by the per-
centage of firm outstanding shares held by activist institutional investors. This
study examines how the threat of shareholder intervention ex ante affects man-
agers’ innovation incentives. Thus, the intervention threat measure is based on
the presence of activist institutional investors who have a history of activist in-
terventions against any U.S. incorporated firms, rather than based on SEC 13D
filings, which indicates actual intervention at the focal firm. In addition, prior
studies on shareholder activism have focused on the activist investors with 5%
ownership. According to a recent report by J.P. Morgan, even small stakes (less
than 1%) can be sufficient for activist shareholders to be effective.1 My primary
1
See the J.P. Morgan report “The Activist Revolution: Understanding and Navigating a New World of Height-
ened Investor Scrutiny” (January 2015). The report shows that about 26.8% of activist campaigns targeting $10
billion-plus market capitalization companies and 59.2% of campaigns targeting $25 billion-plus companies were
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measure of shareholder intervention threat is based on the ownership of all activist
institutional investors. I construct additional intervention threat measures with
thresholds of 1% and 5% ownership to assess the effects of more influential activist
investors. The results from OLS and negative binomial estimations show that the
threat of shareholder intervention has a significant and economically important
negative effect on firm innovation.
In the above-mentioned mechanism, the threat of shareholder intervention re-
duces managers’ innovation incentives mainly because innovation is often associ-
ated with less precise information as reflected in stock prices. If this mechanism is
valid, then for firms that are more likely to have efficient stock prices, such as those
held by more monitoring institutional investors and/or followed by more financial
analysts, shareholder intervention threat will exert less effects on firm innovation.
Improved stock price efficiency means that the value of the innovation project is
more likely to be reflected in stock prices. Thus, firm managers who undertake
innovation projects are less likely to be mistakenly penalized. Consistent with
the proposed mechanism, I find that for firms with higher holdings by monitoring
institutional investors, the effect of shareholder intervention threat on innovation
becomes weaker. Also, for firms that are followed by more financial analysts, the
threat of intervention exerts a less negative effect on firm innovation.
A potential concern is that the negative association between shareholder inter-
initiated by activists who held less than 1% of firm outstanding shares at announcement.
11
vention threat and firm innovation is driven by activist investors’ selection of less
innovative firms. To address this reverse causality, I rely on a quasi-natural exper-
iment of activist investor closures to generate exogenous variation in the threat
of shareholder intervention. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, market-wide
liquidity shocks caused dramatic declines in the performances of activist hedge
funds. Greenwood and Schor (2009) show that pressuring firms into a takeover is
the most profitable activist strategy. However, the collapse of the global mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) markets makes this major activist strategy unprofitable.
With increasing redemption requests and declining returns from activist strategies,
many activist investors decided to wind down their businesses and redeem their
investors. I identify 20 activist investors who closed their operations in the U.S.
during 2007-2010, accounting for 12.7% of the activist investors in 2006. Activist
investor closures are plausibly exogenous, as the closure decisions are unlikely to
have been motivated by information on the innovation performances of portfolio
firms. Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation results provided here indicate
that firm innovation significantly improves relative to control firms following ex-
ogenous activist investor closures. This finding provides clear evidence for the
causal effect of shareholder intervention threat on firm innovation.
This research contributes to the literature on how corporate governance af-
fects firm innovation. The existing literature shows that governing an innovative
firm is fundamentally different from governing a conventional firm. The optimal
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corporate governance to motivate innovation should involve high tolerance for fail-
ure (Manso, 2011; Tian and Wang, 2014), a compensation scheme that rewards
long-term success (Ederer and Manso, 2013), and protection of managers against
career risks (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). My research shows that
increasing shareholder power and intervention threat reduces manager incentives
to innovate. More restrictions on shareholder intervention may be beneficial for
governing innovative firms. In addition, recent studies by Edmans (2009), and
Edmans and Manso (2011) theorize that institutional investors can exercise gov-
ernance through trading, which causes stock price to be more efficient. My study
suggests that this governance role of institutional investors is essential for innova-
tive firms.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 is a review
of the literature on corporate governance and innovation. Section 2.3 contains the
theoretical framework and hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the data and variable
measurements. Section 2.5 contains the primary empirical results. In Section 2.6,
I discuss the quasi-natural experiment of activist investor closures, and estimate
the effects of activist investor closures on firm innovation. Section 2.7 concludes
the chapter.
2.2. Related Literature
This research fits into the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate
13
governance and innovation. An early paper by Holmstrom (1989) states that in-
novation projects may have extraordinary returns, but they are also highly risky,
unpredictable, and idiosyncratic. The success of innovation projects requires long-
term commitment and substantial human effort. Recent research has highlighted
that governing innovative firms should be fundamentally different from govern-
ing conventional firms, due to these unique characteristics. For example, Manso
(2011) theorizes that the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme should
involve substantial tolerance for failure and rewards for long-run success. Tian and
Wang (2014) show that initial public offering (IPO) firms backed by more failure-
tolerant venture capital investors are more likely to pursue innovation. Aghion,
Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) demonstrate that institutional investors help
increase firm innovation incentives by “insulating” firm managers against the rep-
utational consequences of innovation failure, rather than “disciplining” lazy man-
agers. Ederer and Manso (2013) use a controlled laboratory experiment to show
that the standard pay-for-performance compensation, which has been effective
in inducing managerial effort in conventional firms, is detrimental to innovative
firms. In addition, they find that threats of job termination undermine innovation
incentives, while “golden parachutes” mitigate these negative effects.
The traditional view regarding dual-class share structure is that excess insider
voting rights entrench managers and decrease firm value (Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2010). Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) contend that a dual-class share
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structure may benefit IPO firms because the entrenchment effect enables talented
managers to undertake the innovation projects that are intrinsically more valuable,
but have high near-term uncertainty. Similarly, in the prior literature anti-takeover
provisions are viewed as destroying shareholder value by entrenching firm man-
agers. However, Chemmanur and Tian (2013) provide evidence that anti-takeover
provisions help improve corporate innovation by insulating firm managers from
short-term pressures in the equity market. In addition, Sapra, Subramanian, and
Subramanian (2014) suggest that there is a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship
between external takeover pressure and firm innovation. In particular, firms are
more innovative when anti-takeover laws are severe enough to deter takeovers or
when an unhindered market is developed for corporate control.
This research is also related to the literature on the effects of financial markets
and stock prices on corporate innovation. Stein (1989) develops a model of short-
termism driven by the stock market. In his model, firm managers mislead the stock
market by forsaking good investments to boost current earnings. In equilibrium,
the stock market correctly adjusts for earnings inflation. He and Tian (2013)
demonstrate that financial analysts of the market exert pressure on firm managers
to meet short-term earnings targets, which impedes a firm’s commitment to long-
term innovation investment. Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) provide evidence that
stock liquidity impedes firm innovation by exposing firms to the risk of hostile
takeovers and by reducing institutional investors’ incentives to gather information.
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2.3. Theoretical Framework
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) identify a trade-off between shareholder
control and managerial initiative. Even when shareholder control is ex post ef-
ficient, it constitutes an expropriation threat that ex ante reduces managerial
incentives and non-contractible, firm-specific investment. They propose a mech-
anism in which shareholder control reduces the private benefits that managers
can obtain from exerting effort and initiating profitable projects. Their research
suggests using a dispersed ownership structure to prevent outside investors from
exercising excessive control. I extend Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi by examining
a new mechanism that emphasizes contingent control of shareholders.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) show that optimal control allocations may involve
contingent control, in which controls are allocated between investors and man-
agers (entrepreneurs) depending on the realization of the first-period signal. The
prior literature shows that the stock market is a monitor of managerial perfor-
mance (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993), and many corporate governance actions
are driven by the information summarized in stock prices. For example, Smith
(1996) shows that shareholder activism is often triggered by poor stock price per-
formance, and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) demonstrate that the replacement
of top management is associated with changes in stock price performance. Share-
holders in today’s publicly-traded firms often base their intervention decisions on
the information reflected in the stock prices, especially when shareholders do not
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have incentives to obtain private information due to high monitoring costs. In this
paper, I examine how managers make decisions on innovation investment, when
the intervention of activist investors is contingent on the information reflected in
the stock prices.
2.3.1 Innovation and Stock Price Efficiency
Firm projects are categorized into “innovation” projects and “industry stan-
dard” projects. Following March (1991) and Manso (2011), an innovation project
refers to the exploration of new actions that are superior to previously known ac-
tions, and an industry standard project refers to the exploitation and refinement
of existing well-established actions. The discrete choice between an innovation
project and an industry standard project can be viewed as a choice on the firm’s
strategic direction. Schumpeter (1942) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) propose
that innovation drives economic growth through creative destruction. A new in-
novation destroys the rents of established companies that enjoy monopoly power
derived from their previous technological capability. These studies imply that in
the long run, firms that pursue innovation as their strategic direction have higher
cash flows than firms that focus on exploiting an existing technology advantage.
An established view in the innovation literature is that pursuing innovation
increases information asymmetry between the corporate insiders and the outside
investors. When a firm undertakes an innovation project, the manager of the firm
may be reluctant to disclose the innovation project to prevent competitors from
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imitating it. For example, Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) propose a model in
which innovative firms face a trade-off when deciding whether to disclose private
information about innovation projects. Disclosing innovation information to out-
side investors may help raise external financing at better financial terms. However,
the downside risk is that competitors may obtain useful innovation information
from the disclosure, which may reduce the firm’s initial advantage in the inno-
vation rivalry. In a related study, Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) show that the
firms that are pioneering new technologies may finance their investment in such
technologies with private offerings instead of public offerings, in order to prevent
revealing the innovation information to potential industry entrants. These studies
imply that firms disclose less information when undertaking an innovation project
than when undertaking an industry standard project.
Informed market participants, such as institutional investors and financial an-
alysts, can obtain private information through monitoring and analyzing firms.
Innovation is a complicated process that requires substantial amounts of knowl-
edge and monitoring effort to fully assess the potential of a project. An innovation
project is unique to the firm that developed the innovation. The relative unique-
ness of the innovation makes it difficult for outsiders to precisely determine the
value of the project. Thus, informed market participants may have less precise
information if a firm undertakes an innovation project than if the firm selects an
industry standard project. Aboody and Lev (2000) provide evidence that R&D
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is a major contributor to information asymmetry, and that insiders exploit this
asymmetry to gain substantially from insider trading.
Recent research provides evidence that information asymmetry leads to in-
efficient stock prices. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) empirically demonstrate that
increases in information asymmetry causes a substantial fall in stock prices. Based
on rational expectations models, they show that greater information asymmetry
exposes uninformed investors to more liquidity risk and, thus, reduces uninformed
investors’ demand for the assets. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) provide an alter-
native theory that the efficiency of stock prices is partly determined by the dis-
tribution of information between the insiders and the market professionals. They
state that “unequal access (to information) leads to less aggressive trading by the
market professionals and more aggressive trading by the insider, but the net effect
is an order flow that is less sensitive to traders’ information and thus less infor-
mative (p.112).” Overall, these studies show that greater information asymmetry
is associated with less efficient stock prices.
In sum, when compared with “industry standard” projects, pursuing “inno-
vation” projects is associated with less efficient stock prices. The association of
innovation and stock price efficiency has important implications for firm managers
when they are under significant threat of shareholder intervention.
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2.3.2. A Model of the Threat of Shareholder Intervention and Firm
Innovation
Consider a publicly-traded firm with significant amounts of shares held by
institutional investors. The timeline of the firm is shown in Figure 1. At date 0,
the firm’s manager makes investment decision i ∈ {0, 1}. He can undertake either
an “industry standard” project (i = 0) or an “innovation” project (i = 1). The
manager knows with perfect certainty that the firm’s future cash flows (realized at
date 2) is a under industry standard project, and is a+b under innovation project.
It is assumed that b > 0. That is, the future cash flow of the innovation project is
higher than that of the industry standard project. At date 1, activist shareholders
assess firm performance and decide on whether to intervene. Conditional on the
activist shareholders being unsatisfied with firm performance, the extent to which
activist shareholders can implement intervention is denoted by λ ∈ [0, 1]. In most
cases, activist shareholders have partial control. They do not have a majority
of the votes, but they can unite with other shareholder groups to gain effective
control and implement intervention. λ represents activist shareholders’ ability
to intervene, which we interpret as a measure of intervention threat. Although
intervention occurs at date 1, firm managers at date 0 have some knowledge about
λ. If intervention occurs at date 1, the project is liquidated, and the firm manager
is replaced. It is assumed that the industry standard project and the innovation
project have the same liquidation value VL. If no intervention occurs, at date 2,
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Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 
• Firm manager 
chooses innovation 
project or industry 
standard project, 
and executes the 
project. 
 
 
 
 
• Shareholders observe 
stock price S . 
 
• Shareholders decide  
whether to intervene.   
 
• If intervention occurs, 
the project is liquidated 
at value VL.  
 
 
• Project’s cash 
flows are realized.  
 
• Manager receives 
compensation. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Model
the project’s cash flow is realized. Both shareholders and managers are assumed to
be risk-neutral. For simplicity, I assume a zero discount rate across time periods.
After the firm manager has undertaken a project, at date 1 shareholders observe
a signal S ∈ [0,∞). If the signal is below shareholders’ threshold level Sc, activist
shareholders may initiate intervention. The literature on corporate governance
shows that stock market is a monitor of managerial performance (Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1993). Many corporate governance actions are driven by the information
summarized in stock price. For example, Smith (1996) shows that shareholder
activism is often triggered by poor stock price performance, and Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985) show that the replacement of top management is associated with
changes in stock price performance. Following this literature, stock price is taken
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as the major signal of firm performance.
Stock price efficiency is defined as the extent to which stock price reflects a firm’s
fundamental value. More efficient stock price implies that stock price measures
firm value with less noise. After an investment project is set up at date 0, informed
traders at date 1 trade the firm’s stock based on their private information. If the
firm invests in the innovation project, potential information asymmetry may cause
outside market professionals to trade less aggressively, and thus less information
of outside market professionals would be incorporated into stock price. Firm stock
price at date 1 would be less precise with respect to the firm’s fundamental value.
At date 0, before making project decisions, firm managers conjecture about the
firm’s stock price at date 1 for each of the alternative projects. If the industry
standard project is undertaken, stock price would reflect firm value more precisely,
and date 1 stock price would be distributed according to S0 ∼ N (a, σ2). If the
innovation project is pursued, stock price may measure firm value less precisely,
and date 1 stock price would be distributed as S1 ∼ N (a+ b, η2). In this setting,
η2 > σ2, implying that innovation project is associated with more noise in stock
price. Denote τ 2 = η2 − σ2.
Before making investment decisions, managers also conjecture about the share-
holder’s intervention threshold. The shareholder’s objective is to maximize firm
value, and shareholders rely on stock price to infer firm performance. Shareholders
will choose intervention threshold Sc to maximize the firm’s value:
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max
Sc
V =
ˆ ∞
Sc
S h(S) dS +
ˆ Sc
0
VL h(S) dS (1)
The first term represents the firm’s value when no intervention occurs. Share-
holders receive stock price value S at date 2. The second term represents the firm’s
value when shareholders intervene and liquidate the project. h (S) is the probabil-
ity density function of stock price. The first-order condition for the shareholder’s
maximization problem is
∂V
∂Sc
= −Sch (Sc) + VLh (Sc) = 0 (2)
The first-order condition gives Sc = VL. Firm managers conjecture that share-
holders intervene when the firm’s stock price is below the liquidation value.
The manager’s objective is to maximize compensation. Manager’s compensa-
tion is a function of the project’s cash flow. If the project is continued to period
2, the manager’s compensation is k(a+ b) (if undertaking the innovation project),
and ka ( if undertaking the industry standard project). If the project is intervened
and liquidated, the manager’s compensation is zero. At date 0, when the manager
chooses an investment project, he considers both the project’s expected future
cash flow and the probability of intervention.
First, we look at the case where the manager undertakes an industry standard
project.
U(i = 0) = ka ·
{
1−
ˆ VL
0
1√
2piσ
exp
[
−12
(
S0 − a
σ
)2]
dS0 · λ
}
+ 0 ·
ˆ VL
0
1√
2piσ
exp
[
−12
(
S0 − a
σ
)2]
dS0 · λ
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= ka ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a
σ
)
· λ
]
(3)
The expression enclosed in braces is the probability that the industry standard
project will continue to date 2, which is equivalent to one minus the probability
of intervention. The probability of intervention
´ VL
0
1√
2piσ exp
[
−12
(
S0−a
σ
)2]
dS0 ·λ
consists of two parts: (1) the probability that the signal observed by shareholders,
S0, is below the threshold level VL, and (2) the intervention threat λ, which is
the probability that active shareholders can implement intervention (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1).
The former part can be obtained by integrating the probability density function
of the normal distribution. It can also be written in the form of a cumulative
distribution function, as shown by Φ
(
VL−a
σ
)
. Here, Φ represents the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. σ is positive by
assumption.
Similarly, when undertaking an innovation project, the manager’s expected
compensation is given by
U (i = 1) = k(a+ b) ·
1−
ˆ VL
0
1√
2pi
√
(σ2 + τ2)
exp
−12
(
S1 − a− b√
(σ2 + τ2)
)2 dS1 · λ

+ 0 ·
ˆ VL
0
1√
2pi
√
(σ2 + τ2)
exp
−12
(
S1 − a− b√
(σ2 + τ2)
)2 dS1 · λ
= k(a+ b) ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a− b
(σ2 + τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
(4)
When compared with an industry standard project, an innovation project in-
creases the manager’s compensation by kb, and increases the noise of the signal
by τ 2. It is assumed that VL < a. This means that the shareholder intervention
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threshold is below the expected cash flow of the industry standard project. Since
a < a + b, it follows that VL < a + b. This condition guarantees that both the
industry standard project and the innovation project are in the manager’s choice
set.
When a manager decides on which project to undertake, he compares the ex-
pected compensation under the innovation project with that under the alternative
industry standard project.
4U ≡ U (i = 1) − U(i = 0) = k(a+b) ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a− b
(σ2 + τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
− ka ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a
σ
)
· λ
]
(5)
In (5) 4U > 0 means that the expected compensation of undertaking the
innovation project is higher than the expected compensation of industry standard
project. Firm managers will prefer the innovation project. 4U < 0 implies the
reverse. The sign of4U is basically determined by two factors: (1) b, the expected
cash flow of the innovation project in excess of the industry standard project; (2)
τ 2, the increased noise in the stock price signal of the innovation project.
Firm managers face a trade-off. If they undertake the innovation project, their
compensation improves with higher expected future cash flow, but the increased
noise in stock price signal may evoke higher probability of intervention. In (5), the
term Φ
(
VL−a−b
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
· λ shows the probability of intervention when the innovation
project is undertaken. The probability of intervention is increasing in τ 2, and
decreasing in b. Compare the two terms Φ
(
VL−a−b
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
and Φ
(
VL−a
σ
)
in (5). If
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VL−a−b
(σ2+τ2)1/2 >
VL−a
σ
, that is 0 < b < (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
, pursuing the innovation
project increases the probability of intervention. If VL−a−b(σ2+τ2)1/2 <
VL−a
σ
, that is b >
(a−VL)[(σ2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
, undertaking the innovation project decreases the probability
of intervention. In the second case, the positive effect of b is large enough to
counteract the negative effect of τ 2.
To determine the sign of 4U, we examine both the expected project cash flow
and the probability of intervention. First, consider the case b ≥ (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
.
The innovation project has higher expected cash flow than the industry standard
project (a+ b > a). The probability of intervention, if the firm pursues an inno-
vation project, is lower than (or equal to) the probability of intervention when the
firm undertakes an industry standard project. That is, Φ
(
VL−a−b
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
≤ Φ
(
VL−a
σ
)
.
It follows immediately that 4U > 0. This implies that when the benefit of the
innovation project b ≥ (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
, firm managers will prefer the innovation
project.
Now consider the case 0 < b < (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
. By pursuing an innovation
project, the firm has higher expected cash flow (a+ b > a). But an innovation
project also incurs higher probability of intervention, Φ
(
VL−a−b
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
> Φ
(
VL−a
σ
)
.
The sign of 4U is determined by the relative magnitude of b and τ 2. If the effect
of b dominates that of τ 2, 4U is positive. Conversely, if the effect of τ 2 dominates
that of b, 4U becomes negative.
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Proposition 1 : There exists a unique threshold b¯ on the interval
(
0, (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
)
such that for all b > b¯, 4U is positive; and for all b < b¯, 4U is negative.
Proof:
From (5)
lim
b→0
4U = ka ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a
(σ2 + τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
− ka ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a
σ
)
· λ
]
< 0 (6)
Recall that when b = (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
, 4U > 0. In addition, 4U is assumed
to be continuous in b on the interval
(
0, (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
]
. By the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists b¯ on the interval
(
0, (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
)
such that
4U = 0. Furthermore,
∂4U
∂b
= k
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a− b
(σ2 + τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
+ k (a+ b) Φ′
(
VL − a− b
(σ2 + τ2)1/2
)
· λ(σ2 + τ2)1/2 > 0 (7)
This implies that 4U is monotonically increasing in b. Hence, there is a unique
b¯ on the interval
(
0, (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
)
, such that for all b > b¯, 4U > 0; and for
all b < b¯, 4U < 0. Q.E.D.
The key implication of Proposition 1 is that shareholder intervention threat
imposes a threshold b¯, which determines whether an innovation project is worth
pursuing. Without the shareholder intervention threat, all innovation projects that
have b > 0 can be undertaken. When shareholder intervention threat is present,
only the innovation projects that have b > b¯ can be pursued. The threshold b¯
blocks the innovation projects that have moderate levels of expected cash flow.2
2
Looking back at the history of technology development, we may find that many innovations were not very
profitable at the early stage. Some firms invested in the innovation and nurtured the new technology. As the
new technology became mature and highly profitable, these firms arose as leaders in their industry. For example,
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Proposition 2 : The threshold b¯ increases with shareholder intervention threat λ.
Proof:
Recall that when b = b¯, 4U = 0. By substituting b¯ for b into (5), we have
k(a+ b¯) ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a− b¯
(σ2 + τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
− ka ·
[
1− Φ
(
VL − a
σ
)
· λ
]
= 0 (8)
Totally differentiating (8) with respect to b¯ and λ, and combining the expres-
sions, we obtain
∂b¯
∂λ
=
(
a+ b¯
)
Φ
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
− aΦ (VL−aσ )[
1− Φ
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
+
(
a+ b¯
)
Φ′
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
· λ(σ2+τ2)1/2
(9)
Recall that b¯ is on the interval
(
0, (a−VL)[(σ
2+τ2)1/2−σ]
σ
)
. This corresponds with
the case VL−a−b(σ2+τ2)1/2 >
VL−a
σ
. Therefore, the numerator of (9) is positive. In the
denominator of (9), the first term
[
1− Φ
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
is the probability that the
project continues to date 2, which is positive. Φ′
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
in the second term is
the derivative of CDF of standard normal distribution. The properties of normal
distribution show that the derivative of CDF of standard normal distribution is
equal to standard normal PDF. This implies that Φ′
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
is positive. In
addition, the terms
(
a+ b¯
)
and (σ2 + τ2)1/2are positive by assumption, and λ is
non-negative. These terms together show that the denominator of (9) is positive.
Therefore, we have ∂b¯
∂λ
> 0, which implies that the threshold b¯ increases with
shareholder intervention threat λ. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 implies that as the intervention threat of activist investors in-
early digital cameras were not very profitable due to low picture quality and resolution. Canon Inc. was one of
the early firms that pursued the innovation of digital photography, and today has become a dominant company
in the digital camera industry. Good innovation opportunities may not be very profitable when they first arise.
If shareholder intervention imposes threshold b¯, many of these good innovation opportunities will not be pursued.
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creases, more innovation projects will be blocked. Firm managers possess less
discretion to choose an innovation project, especially to pursue those innovations
with low market value at early stage.
In the above analysis, the threat of activist intervention reduces managers’ in-
novation incentives mainly because innovation is often associated with less precise
information reflected in stock prices. In a firm’s information environment, there
might be important information providers (e.g., monitoring institutional investors,
financial analysts) who can potentially bridge the information asymmetry between
corporate insiders and outside investors and improve stock price efficiency. I fur-
ther examine the effects of these information providers on managers’ incentives to
innovate under the threat of activist intervention.
Proposition 3: The effect of the threat of activist intervention λ on threshold
b¯ is weaker when a firm has more information providers who can improve price
informativeness ( τ 2 is reduced) .
Proof:
To show the interaction effect of information providers, we derive the cross-
partial derivative of the threshold b¯ with respect to λ and τ 2 in (10).
∂2b¯
∂λ∂τ2
=
(
a+ b¯
) · Φ′ ( VL−a−b¯(σ2+τ2)1/2) · (a+b¯−VL2 ) 1√(σ2+τ2)3{[
1− Φ
(
(V−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
· λ
]
+
(
a+ b¯
)
Φ′
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
· λ(σ2+τ2)1/2
}2 (10)
By assumption, VL < a. It follows that the term
(
a+b¯−VL
2
)
in the numerator
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of (10) is positive. In addition, the terms
(
a+ b¯
)
, Φ′
(
VL−a−b¯
(σ2+τ2)1/2
)
and 1√
(σ2+τ2)3
are
positive. Thus, the cross-partial derivative is positive. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that when there are more information providers in a firm’s
information environment, which leads to stock prices being more precisely reflect
the value of innovation projects (lower τ 2), the negative impacts of activist threat
on corporate innovation will be alleviated.
2.3.3 Empirical Implications
The theoretical model shows that when firm managers decide on whether to
pursue innovation, the threat of activist intervention imposes a threshold b¯, which
makes firm managers refrain from pursuing some innovation projects. A higher
threshold b¯ means that a larger proportion of innovation projects will be blocked.
While we cannot directly observe b¯, we can empirically examine the relationship
between the threat of activist intervention and corporate innovation outcome.
Based on propositions 1 and 2, the threat of activist investors negatively affects
manager’s incentives to pursue innovation. Thus, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : The threat of activist intervention negatively affects firm innova-
tion.
Proposition 3 implies that the effects of activist threat on firm innovation will
be reduced when a firm has more information providers on the market who can
help incorporate the information about innovation projects into stock price. I
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examine the roles of monitoring institutional investors and financial analysts, as
previous literature shows that these information providers are associated with the
information efficiency of a firm’s stock price.
Institutional investors are important information providers on the financial
market. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) demonstrate that stocks with greater insti-
tutional ownership are priced more efficiently, and both institutional holdings and
institutional trading activities contribute to the information efficiency of stock
prices. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) provide evidence that institutional in-
vestors help accelerate the incorporation of firm-specific earnings news into stock
prices. According to Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), among all institutional in-
vestors, independent institutions with long-term investments specialize in mon-
itoring firm management. These “monitoring institutional investors” are more
likely to obtain information about the value of the innovation projects, and con-
vey that information to the stock market. When monitoring institutional investors
help improve stock price efficiency, innovation projects are less likely to be inter-
vened, as intervention is now based on more precise information. As a result, firm
managers will have more incentives to innovate.
Besides improving stock price efficiency, monitoring institutional investors have
more roles to play. When monitoring institutional investors are actively involved in
intervention activities, they can rely on their own private information rather than
the information contained in the stock prices to make intervention decisions. This
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helps relieve firm managers from the intervention pressure caused by imprecise
information in stock prices. When monitoring investors do not pursue shareholder
activism, their information can be pivotal to the outcome of other investors’ inter-
vention activities. An activist shareholder often needs to unite with other share-
holders to win an activism campaign. If the monitoring investors have information
that a manager’s innovation project can greatly improve shareholder value in the
long run, monitoring investors will not support the activism campaign or may
even defeat activist shareholder attempts. This role is particularly important for
firms in which special interest groups take activism to promote their own interest
at the expense of other shareholders. Overall, monitoring institutional investors
can help promote manager incentives to pursue valuable innovation projects when
the managers are under shareholder intervention threat. Thus, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a: Among firms with higher holdings by monitoring institutional
investors, activist intervention threat has a less negative effect on firm innovation.
Financial analysts are another group of important information intermediaries
between corporate managers and financial market investors. These analysts devote
their resources to gather information about a firm’s earnings prospects. Frankel
and Li (2004) show that an increase in financial analysts that follow a firm is
associated with reduced information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
Similarly, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that analyst forecasting activity
accelerates the incorporation of the industry and firm-specific information into
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stock prices. Financial analysts improve stock price efficiency through their firm-
specific earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, and through identifying
earnings news that are common to a specific industry. When a firm is followed
by more financial analysts, firm managers would expect that the value of their
innovation projects is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices, and they
are less likely to face intervention. Thus, firm managers will be less inclined to
be biased against an innovation project when they are under intervention threat.
Following this logic, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2b: When firms are followed by more financial analysts, activist
intervention threat has a less negative effect on firm innovation.
2.4. Data and Variable Measurement
I construct a firm-level panel dataset with data on innovation, shareholder in-
tervention threat, shareholder monitoring, and financial analysts using a variety
of sources. The starting point is the Compustat database, which contains basic
financial and accounting data for all U.S. publicly listed firms since 1950. Inno-
vation is measured using patent statistics. Patent data are manually collected
from the Thomson Innovation database. The measure of shareholder intervention
threat is constructed by combining the activist investor information from FactSet’s
corporate activism database with the ownership data from Thomson Reuters In-
stitutional (13F) Holdings Database. Financial analyst information is obtained
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from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Database. The final
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 2097 publicly-traded firms. These firms
have at least one patent application during the sample period. The explanatory
variables are constructed using data from 2001-2008. The dependent variables of
innovation are constructed using patent data from 2001-2013.
Firm Innovation
Patents and patent statistics have been widely used as indicators of innovation
(Griliches, 1990). The first measure of innovation in this study is the total number
of patent applications filed by a firm in a given year (Total Patents). Patent
application year, rather than patent grant year, is used to capture the time of
innovation (Griliches, Pakes, and Hall, 1988). Patents vary in their value and
impact. Prior literature suggests that patents of greater economic value were
cited more frequently in subsequent patents (Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff, et al.,
1999). A second innovation measure is the count of highly-cited patents (Highly-
Cited Patents). Firms with more highly-cited patents tend to have more original,
influential inventions, and have larger share of the leading-edge technologies in
their industry. To identify highly-cited patents, I calculate the median of the
forward citations of all the patents in an industry (4-digit SIC industry) that are
filed in a given year, and then localize the patents whose forward citations are
higher than the median number of citations in its respective industry. For each
firm, I count the number of highly-cited patents.
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Patent and citation data were manually collected from the Thomson Innova-
tion database. Thomson Innovation, launched by Thomson Reuters in 2007, is a
comprehensive and integrated patent search and analysis platform. The database
provides access to patent information from all major patenting authorities world-
wide and the Derwent World Patents Index. Its collection of U.S. granted patents
covers the years from 1836 to present, and the patents granted by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Based on Thomson Innovation, I obtain the
patent portfolio for 2097 U.S. publicly-traded firms, with patent data up to 2013.
The information includes patent assignee name, application date, publication date,
count of forward citations, the publication number of the citing patents, patent
class, name of inventor, etc.
A truncation problem exists in the database: many patents that have been
filed, but have not yet been granted by USPTO, are not included in the database.
As noted in the literature on innovation (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005),
there is a significant lag (an average of two years) between patent applications and
patent grants. As we approach the last year of the patent database, we observe
only a fraction of all patents that have been filed. So, following Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001, 2005), the truncation bias is corrected by constructing “weight
factors” based on the application-grant empirical distribution.
Shareholder Intervention Threat
In publicly-traded firms, shareholder intervention activities are often performed
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by activist institutional investors. The broad category of activist investors include
pure-play activists and multi-strategy funds.3 The pure-play activists specialize
exclusively in activism, and pressure for firm change through concentrated stake in
a company. The multi-strategy investors are typically diversified and use several
strategies within the same pool of assets. These investors have broadened their
traditional passive investment model to include more activist-oriented approach.
I measure the threat of shareholder intervention by the percentage of firm out-
standing shares held by the activist institutional investors. First, I classify firm
institutional investors into activist and non-activist groups. If an investor has ac-
tivism campaigns (against any U.S. incorporated firms) in the current year or in
the previous one year, the investor is categorized as an activist investor. Second, I
identify activist investors based on FactSet’s corporate activism database, Shark-
Watch. The database provides activist investor profiles with detailed information
on their previous campaigns, tactics, and outcome. It tracks various types of ac-
tivist investors, including investment advisors, mutual funds, pension funds, hedge
funds, labor unions, and other institutions and stakeholders. I obtain the names of
the activist investors from the SharkWatch database, and search these names in the
Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. This procedure identi-
fies 259 activist institutional investors who have at least one shareholder activism
campaign during 2001-2008. Finally, for each publicly-traded firm, I aggregate the
3
See the J.P. Morgan report “The Activist Revolution: Understanding and Navigating a New World of Height-
ened Investor Scrutiny” (January 2015).
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13F holdings of all its activist investors, which gives us the basic measure of the
threat of shareholder intervention.4 For robustness check, I construct additional
measures of shareholder intervention threat by requiring an activist investor to
have at least 1% ownership, or alternatively 5% ownership in a firm, rather than
including all activist investors of a firm.
Shareholder Monitoring
Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) show that among all institutional investors, the
independent investors with long-term investments specialize in monitoring the
firm. The extent of shareholder monitoring is measured by the percentage of firm
outstanding shares held by these “monitoring investors”. Following Chen, Harford,
and Li, the “independent” investor group includes investment companies, indepen-
dent investment advisors, and public pension funds. “Long-term investment” is
defined as a firm holding shares for greater than one year. Bushee (1998) analyzes
the investment patterns of institutions, and classifies institutional investors into
three categories: dedicated, quasi-indexer, and transient. Dedicated institutions
and quasi-indexers are most likely to perform the monitoring role. As in Chen,
Harford, and Li, the “monitoring investors” are constructed by intersecting the
group of independent institutions holding long-term investments with Bushee’s
(1998) categories of dedicated investors and quasi-indexer investors. I focus on
4
A limitation of this measure is that if an activist investor is not a 13F institutional investor, its influence in
the firm is not captured by the measure.
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the monitoring activities of non-activist shareholders and their information effect.
I select the monitoring investors that did not have activism campaigns (against
any U.S. incorporated firms) in the past five years. Their ownership data are
obtained from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. The
final measure of shareholder monitoring is constructed by aggregating the 13F
holdings of a firm’s non-activist monitoring investors.
Analyst Following
The intensity of information collection by a firm’s financial analysts is proxied
by the number of financial analysts following the firm. Financial analyst data
are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S Detail History file. For each
firm in each calendar year, I calculate the maximum number of financial analysts
that make one-year-ahead forecasts. Firms that are not covered by the I/B/E/S
database are assumed to have no analyst coverage.
Control Variables
As in the innovation literature, I control for firm-specific and industry charac-
teristics that may affect firm innovation. I control for firm size, which is proxied
by a firm’s book value of total assets (Assets). Firms with greater growth oppor-
tunities are more likely to innovate. Firm growth opportunities are measured by
Tobin’s Q. Since firm innovation tends to affect stock market value, Tobin’s Q will
be endogenous in the regression. To address this concern, I include the industry
38
median Tobin’s Q (“industry Q”) to control for the investment opportunities at
the industry (4-digit SIC code) level. Since innovation is directly related to firm
investment level, firm capital expenditure (scaled by total assets) is included as
a control. I also control for firm profitability (measured by return-on-assets ra-
tio (ROA)), asset tangibility (measured by net properties, plants, and equipment
(PPE), scaled by total assets), financial leverage (measured by the ratio of debt
to total firm value), and financial constraints (proxied by Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) five variable KZ index).
Firm innovation activities may vary with firm age. Balasubramanian and Lee
(2008) show that firm age is negatively related to innovation quality. They argue
that organizational inertia and reduced learning rates associated with older firms
are the main reasons for the decline in innovation quality. Firm age is approxi-
mated by the number of years a firm is listed in the Compustat database. Aghion,
et al. (2005) propose that product market competition discourages laggard firms
from innovating but encourages neck-and-neck firms to innovate. They find an
inverted-U relationship between a firm’s product market competition and inno-
vation. Product market competition (measured by the Herfindahl sale index) is
included as a control. Industry fixed effects are controlled by including industry
dummies. The definition of industry is based on the SIC 3-digit code. The vari-
ables Assets, ROA, CapExp/Assets, PPE/Assets, Leverage, and KZIndex have
many outliers. To minimize the effect of outliers, these variables are winsorized
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at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table
2.1.
Summary Statistics
In Table 2.2, I report the summary statistics of the variables used in this
study. The innovation variables Total Patents and Highly-Cited Patents are highly
skewed. For Total Patents, the mean is 39.2, but the median is 3. Similarly, the
mean of Highly-Cited Patents is 17.1, but the median is 1. For an average firm
in the sample, 3.3% of the outstanding shares of the firm are held by activist in-
stitutional investors, 23.4% of the firm shares are held by non-activist monitoring
investors, and the firm is followed by about 9 financial analysts. The measure of
firm size, Assets, is also skewed, with a mean of 6.4 billion, and a median of 421
million. Regarding other variables, an average firm has a return-on-assets ratio
of 0.02, a capital expenditure-to-assets ratio of 0.045, a PPE-to-assets ratio of
0.214, a leverage ratio of 0.273, a KZ Index of -11.187, and is 20 years old. At the
industry (4-digit SIC) level, an average firm’s industry Q is 2.105, and the average
Herfindahl sale Index is 0.225.
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Table 2.2
Summary Statistics
Variables 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Mean SD N
Total Patents 0 0 3.002 13.078 149.735 39.230 178.496 13414
Highly-Cited Patents 0 0 1.031 6.085 65.935 17.098 77.459 13414
Activist Investor Ownership 0 0.001 0.008 0.040 0.149 0.033 0.056 13414
Monitoring Investor Ownership 0.003 0.087 0.231 0.350 0.513 0.234 0.165 13362
Analysts 0 2 6 13 29.25 9.121 9.591 13014
Assets (in Millions) 12.9 82.3 421.0 2503.0 30356.3 6429.0 21696.7 13414
Tobin’s Q 0.692 1.191 1.789 2.959 7.858 2.928 6.045 13414
Industry Q 0.956 1.354 1.798 2.533 3.881 2.105 2.568 13414
ROA -0.528 -0.029 0.095 0.169 0.304 0.020 0.298 13414
CapExp / Assets 0.004 0.016 0.031 0.055 0.141 0.045 0.049 13414
PPE / Assets 0.018 0.069 0.153 0.291 0.644 0.214 0.198 13414
Leverage 0 0.003 0.189 0.421 0.837 0.273 0.342 13414
KZIndex -47.220 -8.169 -2.250 0.339 3.337 -11.187 38.607 13414
Firm Age 4 9 14 27 54 19.988 15.410 13414
Herfindahl Index 0.058 0.096 0.172 0.279 0.606 0.225 0.185 13414
2.5. Empirical Results
2.5.1 The Effects of the Threat of Shareholder Intervention on Firm
Innovation
To examine the effects of shareholder intervention threat on firm innovation, I
estimate the empirical model in (11):
E(Innovationi,t+n|Xi,t, νk, µt, ηi) = exp(β0+β1×Intervention Threati,t+γXi,t+νk+µt+ηi)
(11)
Here, Innovationi,t+n is firm i’s innovation performance at year t+ n. Innova-
tion projects on average take two years to yield successful, patentable technologies.
I examine firm innovation outcome from year t+ 1 to year t+ 4, with a focus on
the innovation outcome at year t + 2. Intervention Threati,t represents the level
of shareholder intervention threat of firm i at year t, and is measured by the
percentage of firm outstanding shares held by the group of activist institutional
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investors. Xi,t are control variables, νk is an industry fixed effect, µt is a year fixed
effect, and ηi is a firm fixed effect. Equation (11) adopts the log-link formulation
because of the non-negative and highly skewed nature of the count-based data.
OLS and negative binomial estimators are applied to estimate (11). I perform
an overdispersion test on the patent data (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 2009),
and the test results indicate the presence of considerable overdispersion in our
data. A negative binomial estimator, which explicitly models overdispersion, is
appropriate in this situation. As in Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999),
and Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), I control for firm fixed effects ηi
using the “presample mean scaling” method. Specifically, I use a firm’s average
number of patents (and highly-cited patents) over the presample period as a proxy
for unobserved heterogeneity. This method controls for permanent differences in
a firm’s propensity to innovate. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are
controlled by including year dummies and industry dummies (constructed based
on 3-digit SIC code). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to avoid
inflated t-statistics.
In Table 2.3, I report the estimated effects of shareholder intervention threat
on firm innovation at year t+ 2. Columns (1) and (2) include the OLS estimates,
where the dependent variable ln(Total Patentst+2) is the natural logarithm of one
plus the total number of patents applied by firm i at year t+2, and ln(Highly-Cited
Patentst+2) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents applied by
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Table 2.3: The Effects of Shareholder Intervention Threat on Firm Innovation
This table shows the pooled OLS and negative binomial estimates of the effects of shareholder inter-
vention threat on firm innovation. The main explanatory variable Intervention Threat is measured by
the percentage of firm outstanding shares held by activist institutional investors. Firm fixed effects are
controlled using the “presample mean scaling” method, following the procedure in Blundell, Griffith,
and Van Reenen (1999). Robust standard errors clustered by firm are displayed in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Model OLS OLS Negative Binomial Negative Binomial
Dependent
Variable
ln (Total
Patentst+2)
ln (Highly-Cited
Patentst+2)
Total Patentst+2
Highly-Cited
Patentst+2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intervention
Threat
-0.962*** -0.823*** -1.239*** -0.921**
(0.311) (0.276) (0.423) (0.467)
ln (Assets) 0.289*** 0.220*** 0.500*** 0.457***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026)
Industry Q 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
ROA -0.075 -0.053 -0.299*** -0.225**
(0.063) (0.054) (0.097) (0.109)
CapExp / Assets 2.177*** 1.838*** 3.403*** 3.611***
(0.381) (0.332) (0.581) (0.644)
PPE / Assets -0.431*** -0.315** -0.890*** -0.870***
(0.153) (0.131) (0.224) (0.246)
Leverage -0.250*** -0.210*** -0.270*** -0.289***
(0.048) (0.042) (0.070) (0.079)
KZIndex -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln (Firm Age) -0.133*** -0.104*** -0.226*** -0.236***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.043) (0.047)
Herfindahl Index -0.569 -0.490 -0.601 -0.551
(0.387) (0.344) (0.550) (0.594)
Herfindahl Index 2 0.181 0.214 -0.195 -0.238
(0.438) (0.385) (0.622) (0.659)
Constant -0.277* -0.346*** -1.998*** -2.308***
(0.142) (0.126) (0.555) (0.562)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13414 13414 13414 13414
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firm i at year t+ 2 that received a higher amount of citations (than the industry
median) in subsequent years. The coefficients on shareholder intervention threat
are negative and statistically significant. It shows that a ten percentage point
increase in activist investor ownership (e.g., from the median of 0.008 to 0.108)
is associated with a 9.6% decrease in the total number of patents and an 8.2%
decrease in the number of highly-cited (highly influential) patents. In Columns
(3) and (4), I report the results of the negative binomial estimations, with Total
Patentst+2 and Highly-Cited Patentst+2 being the dependent variables. The coeffi-
cients on shareholder intervention threat remain significant with a larger marginal
effect. These results show that the threat of shareholder intervention negatively
affects firm innovation incentives. In Appendix Table A1, I present the estimated
effects of shareholder intervention threat (at time t) on firm innovation perfor-
mance from t + 1 to t + 4. The estimation results are qualitatively similar over
the four years, although the effects decline slightly for years t+ 3 and t+ 4.
The results are robust to using alternative measures of shareholder intervention
threat. The primary measure of intervention threat used in Table 2.3 is constructed
by aggregating the 13F holdings of all activist institutional investors in a firm. Al-
ternatively, we can select activist institutional investors who own more than 1%
of firm outstanding shares, or own more than 5% of firm outstanding shares. As
shown in Appendix Table A2, the results are similar using a different share owner-
ship threshold. For example, the marginal effect of shareholder intervention threat
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is -0.993 based on activist institutional investors who have at least 1% ownership,
and is -0.987 based on activist investors who have at least 5% ownership. When
including all activist institutional investors of a firm, the marginal effect is -0.962
(Table 2.3). I also examine whether the effect of shareholder intervention threat
on innovation is monotonic. In an untabulated analysis, I include a quadratic
term for Intervention Threati,t in equation (11), and rerun the regressions. The
coefficient on the square of Intervention Threati,t is not statistically significant.
2.5.2 Shareholder Monitoring and Analyst Following
This research highlights the information roles of institutional investors and
financial analysts. I propose that when “monitoring” institutional investors and
financial analysts help incorporate innovation-related information into stock price,
improving price efficiency, the negative effects of shareholder intervention threat on
firm innovation will be reduced. The information roles of monitoring institutional
investors and financial analysts are particularly important for the firms that are
less transparent and suffer more from the information asymmetry problem.
To examine this possibility, I estimate empirical models in (12) and (13) using
OLS and negative binomial methods:
E(Innovationi,t+n|Xi,t, νk, µt, ηi) = exp(β0+β1×Intervention Threati,t+β2×ShareholderMonitoringi,t
+ β3 × Intervention Threati,t × ShareholderMonitoringi,t + γXi,t + νk + µt + ηi) (12)
E(Innovationi,t+n|Xi,t, νk, µt, ηi) = exp(β0+β1×Intervention Threati,t+β2×Analyst Followingi,t
+ β3 × Intervention Threati,t ×Analyst Followingi,t + γXi,t + νk + µt + ηi) (13)
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Here, ShareholderMonitoringi,t indicates the level of shareholder monitoring,
which is measured by the percentage of firm outstanding shares held by the group
of non-activist, monitoring institutional investors. Analyst Followingi,t represents
the intensity of information collection by financial analysts, and is proxied by
the number of financial analysts following the firm.5 The information effects of
monitoring institutional investors and financial analysts are tested in a subsample
of firms that are more likely to suffer from information asymmetry problem. I
sort firms into quintiles based on market capitalization, and retain firms in the
lower quintiles. Firms with large market capitalization have greater visibility and
less information asymmetry. The roles of monitoring institutional investors and
financial analysts in bridging information asymmetry will be greater for small
capitalization firms than for large firms.
Table 2.4 reports the estimated interaction effects of shareholder monitoring
and analyst following, respectively. Coefficients in columns (1), (3), (5), and
(7) show a positive and significant interaction effect of shareholder monitoring,
implying that the monitoring activities of non-activist shareholders mitigate the
negative effects of shareholder intervention threat on firm innovation. Using the
estimation result in column (1) as an example, the estimated interaction effect of
shareholder monitoring is 4.544. Consider a firm in which 8.7% of firm outstand-
5
ShareholderMonitoringi,t and Analyst Followingi,t are highly correlated, with a Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cient equal to 0.526. This means that firms that have more monitoring institutional investors tend to have more
analysts that follow the firms and make forecasts.
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ing shares are held by monitoring institutional investors (at the 25th percentile
of the shareholder monitoring distribution). Increasing the firm’s intervention
threat (proxied by activist investor ownership) from the median value of 0.008 to
the 90 percentile value of 0.102, leads to a decrease in firm innovation by 12.4%
(= [−1.711+4.544×0.087]× [0.102−0.008]). In contrast, for a firm that has 35%
of outstanding shares held by monitoring institutional investors (at the 75th per-
centile of the shareholder monitoring distribution), increasing intervention threat
from the median value of 0.008 to the 90 percentile value of 0.102, leads to a
decrease in firm innovation by 1.1% (= [−1.711 + 4.544× 0.35]× [0.102− 0.008]).
Overall, at the higher levels of shareholder monitoring, the threat of shareholder
intervention exerts less negative effect on firm innovation.
The estimated interaction effects of analyst following are reported in columns
(2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 2.4. The coefficients on the interaction term
Intervention Threat × ln(Analysts) are positive and statistically significant in
all four columns. This means that firms followed by more analysts are less likely
to forego innovation in response to increasing threat of shareholder intervention.
Taking the results in column (2) as an illustration of this effect, the estimate of
the interaction effect of analyst following is 0.783. Consider a firm that is followed
by only 2 financial analysts (at the 25th percentile of the analyst following distri-
bution). An increase of intervention threat level from the median value of 0.008
to the 90 percentile value of 0.102, is associated with a drop in firm innovation by
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10.6% (= [−1.987 + 0.783× 1.099]× [0.102− 0.008]). However, when the number
of analysts following the firm increases to 13 (at the 75th percentile of the analyst
following distribution), increasing intervention threat does not significant affect
firm innovation. These results basically support the hypothesis that financial an-
alysts help mitigate the negative effects of shareholder intervention threat on firm
innovation.
2.6 Quasi-Natural Experiment of Activist Investor Closures
In the empirical analysis of Section 2.5, the negative coefficients in the regres-
sions of firm innovation on shareholder intervention threat support the hypothesis
that the intervention threats negatively affect firm manager innovation incentives.
A major concern is that less innovative firms may attract more activist institu-
tional investors and, thus, a higher level of intervention threat. To address this
reverse causality concern, I adopt an identification strategy that relies on a quasi-
natural experiment of activist investor closures to generate exogenous variation in
levels of shareholder intervention threat. For this natural experiment to be valid,
two conditions must be satisfied. First, activist investor closures must correlate
with a decrease in shareholder intervention threat (relevance condition). Second,
activist investor closures must only affect firm innovation through their effect on
shareholder intervention threat (exogeneity condition). Section 2.6.1 discusses the
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main reasons for activist investor closures, and explains why the closure events
are plausibly exogenous. Section 2.6.2 examines the magnitude of the interven-
tion threat change caused by activist investor closures.
2.6.1 The Closures of Activist Institutional Investors
Activist institutional investors often undertake intervention activities, and their
shareholdings constitute a real threat to firm managers. During the 2007-2009
financial crisis, a large portion of activist institutional investors closed their busi-
nesses.6 For example, Tim Barakett, the founder of Atticus Capital and “one of the
fathers of modern hedge fund activism”, closed down two flagship activist funds
in 2009,7and returned approximately $3 billion to investors (Financial Times,
August 12, 2009). Among activist institutional investors, the closure events con-
centrated on activist hedge funds. In the financial crisis period, the whole hedge
fund industry experienced a liquidity crisis. Investor confidence in the world’s
financial market and in hedge funds fell dramatically, especially after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. in 2008. Many hedge funds received substan-
tial redemption requests from the fund investors, even when fund performance
remained relatively strong. According to New York Law Journal (March 2, 2009),
6
Activist investor closure in this paper means that an activist investor winds down its business and investment
affairs. In industry parlance, “closure” also refers to funds closing to new investors. The latter type of closure is
not the subject of this research.
7
Tim Barakett liquidated Atticus Global and Atticus Trading Funds in 2009. Atticus European Fund continued,
which is managed by David Slager. Atticus (the management company) did not have SEC filings after 2009.
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in 2008 hedge fund redemption reached nearly $400 billion, and the assets under
management by the hedge fund industry declined from $2.2 trillion in mid-2008
to $ 1.3 trillion by the end of 2008.
In the financial crisis period, hedge fund closures were largely driven by market-
wide liquidity shocks. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that in times of
crisis, sharp reductions in asset liquidity (the ease of trading assets) and funding
liquidity (the availability of funding) are mutually reinforcing, leading to a liquidity
spiral. Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) demonstrate that these liquidity spirals
cause contagion in hedge fund worst returns. As market-wide liquidity shocks led
to deteriorating hedge fund performances and increasing redemption requests, a
large number of hedge funds chose to close their funds. Ben-David, Franzoni, and
Moussawi (2012) provide evidence that hedge funds exited the U.S. stock market
en masse in 2008 in response to shocks to funding liquidity.
The characteristics and strategies of activist hedge funds make the performance
of these funds more sensitive to liquidity shocks. Hedge funds that are actively
involved in shareholder activism (including pure-play activists and multi-strategy
funds) often need to have “patient money” to execute their strategies or to win
an activism campaign. The fund managers need time to negotiate with corporate
board and management, coordinate with other shareholders, and work on trans-
actions such as mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs. The adverse liquidity shocks
and redemption requests may force activist hedge funds to liquidate their positions
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prematurely. As a result, the returns from the activist strategies cannot be fully
realized.
Even when activist funds were not forced to liquidate their positions, the re-
turns from their activist strategies also declined dramatically. Greenwood and
Schor (2009) state that activist hedge fund returns “are largely explained by the
ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover”, and “activist investors’
portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover inter-
est declined” (p.363). The authors argue that, from the perspective of activist
hedge funds, takeovers are an optimal way to exit their sizable position in the
target. Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, pressuring firms for takeover was
the most profitable activist strategy, and was pursued by many activist hedge
funds.8 However, during the 2007-2009 financial crisis this takeover strategy be-
came unattractive, as the global mergers and acquisitions markets fell sharply.
According to Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2014), the number of takeovers
conducted by activist hedge funds dropped by 57% between 2007 and 2008, and
a further 40% between 2008 and 2009. Other activist strategies, such as improv-
ing corporate governance and business strategies, also experienced difficulties, and
outcomes became unpredictable. Cheffins and Armour (2011) argue that, under
normal economic conditions, shareholders are often receptive to activist overtures
8
Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2014) show that abnormal returns vary considerably across different types
of activist strategies. The average returns is 11 percent for takeover strategy, 7 percent for other forms of
restructuring, and zero to 3 percent for strategies related to governance and payout policy.
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when a company is performing poorly, while, during financial crisis, sharehold-
ers often opt for caution and are reluctant to disrupt the status quo. Patrick
McGurn, special counsel to RiskMetrics Group, parent company of proxy advisor
ISS Governance Services, commented that “[with uncertainty on the financial mar-
ket,] concerns about the market and economy trumped concerns about individual
management or boards” (Financial Times, July 6, 2008).9
In sum, in the financial crisis period, the returns of activist investors declined
sharply because of the market-wide liquidity shocks and the collapse of the global
M&A markets. Combined with increasing redemption requests, many activist
hedge funds decided to close and redeem their investors. Activist investor closures
are plausibly exogenous, as the closure decisions are unlikely to have been moti-
vated by information on the innovation performance of portfolio firms. In fact, the
activist investor closures are concentrated during the financial crisis period, with
cases rarely occurring before and after. This implies that the adverse and precip-
itous economic and market conditions are the main reasons for activist investor
closures. The analyses in Section 2.6.3 show that treatment firms and closely
matched control firms have parallel innovation performances before the activist
investor closures, and this provides supportive evidence that activist investor clo-
sures were not driven by the changes in the innovation performances of portfolio
firms. Overall, activist investor closures are plausibly exogenous, as required for
identification.
9See “Shareholder Democracy is on Hold”, Financial Times, July 7, 2008.
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To identify all activist investors that closed between 2007 and 2010, I com-
bine four sources of activist investor information: FactSet’s corporate activism
database, SEC filings, Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database, and Factiva news.
First, I identify the names of activist investors and the history of their activism
campaigns from FactSet’s corporate activism database. Second, I search the SEC
filings and obtain the last filing dates of individual investors. The investors whose
last filing dates ended in or before 2011 are included as candidates for closing
activist investors. I search for these investors and their key executives in Factiva
news to verify closure events. This procedure helps remove the cases in which
activist investors changed names and operated under new names, as well as the
cases in which investor assets fell below the minimum filing requirement (e.g., $100
million for 13F filings). In addition, I verify investor closures through Hedge Fund
Research (HFR) database if the activist investor is a hedge fund. The final sample
includes 20 activist institutional investors that closed their businesses in the U.S.
between 2007 and 2010. Table 2.5 lists these activist investors. Compared with
the years of 2005 and 2006, in which 157 institutional investors actively pursued
shareholder activism, about 12.7% of these activist investors closed down.
2.6.2 Identifying Treatment and Control Firms
The purpose of the quasi-natural experiment design is to examine how firm
innovation responds following the exogenous changes in the level of shareholder
intervention threat. The group of treatment firms are the U.S. publicly-traded
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Table 2.5 List of Closed Activist Investors
The table lists the closures of activist institutional investors in 2007-2010. Column (1) provides the name
of the closed activist institutional investors, and Column (2) states the year that they closed. Column
(3) reports investor type, and Column (4) indicates the number of activism campaigns the investor
undertook up to the closure year. The name of the activist institutional investors, their type, and their
history of activism campaigns are based on FactSet’s corporate activism database, SharkWatch.
Activist Institutional Investors
(1)
Closure
Year
(2)
Investor Type
(3)
No. of
Activism
Campaigns
(4)
Sowood Capital Management, LP 2007 Hedge Fund 3
Cadence Investment Management, LLC 2007 Hedge Fund 1
Copper Arch Capital, LLC 2007 Hedge Fund 1
Keefe Managers, LLC 2007 Hedge Fund 1
K Capital Partners, LLC 2008 Hedge Fund 11
Flagg Street Capital, LLC 2008 Hedge Fund 2
Stevenson Capital Management, Inc. 2008 Investment Advisor 1
Trivium Capital Management, LLC 2008 Hedge Fund 1
Pirate Capital, LLC 2009 Hedge Fund 24
Mercury Real Estate Advisors, LLC 2009 Investment Advisor 20
Atticus Capital, LLC 2009 Hedge Fund 18
D.B. Zwirn & Co. LP 2009 Hedge Fund 6
RLR Capital Partners, LP 2009 Hedge Fund 3
Deephaven Capital Management, LLC 2009 Hedge Fund 2
Okumus Capital, LLC 2009 Hedge Fund 2
Vardon Capital Management, LLC 2009 Hedge Fund 2
Shamrock Partners Activist Value Fund LLC 2010 Hedge Fund 41
Duquesne Capital Management, LLC 2010 Hedge Fund 2
Eastbourne Capital Management, LLC 2010 Hedge Fund 2
Obrem Capital Management, LLC 2010 Hedge Fund 2
firms in which one or more of the firm’s activist institutional investors closed their
funds during 2007-2010. The identification of treatment firms is based on SEC
13F filings, and the data are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Institutional
Holdings (13F) Database. I track the shareholdings of the 20 activist investors
two years before their closure. Publicly-traded firms, whose shares (at least 1%)
were held by these closing activist investors prior to closure, are defined as the
treatment firms. I exclude the firms that do not have patent data. The final
sample includes 206 treatment firms.
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The control group consists of the U.S. publicly-traded firms that were not
affected by activist investor closures. I match treatment firms and control firms by
year, industry, firm size, investment opportunities, and intervention threat level.
Specifically, the candidate control firms are required to be in the same total assets
quintile, Tobin’s Q quintile, and from the same year and 3-digit SIC industry as
the treatment firms. I calculate the difference in activist investor holdings between
each treatment firm and its candidate control firm one year prior to the closure
event. For each treatment firm, I retain one candidate control firm that has the
smallest difference in activist investor holdings. Both treatment and control firms
are required to have Compustat data prior to and after activist investor closures.
The final sample includes 206 treatment firms and 206 closely-matched control
firms.
To assess how well the control firms match the treatment firms, I compare
important firm characteristics in the pre-event year between the treatment group
and control group. As displayed in Table 2.6, there are no statistically significant
differences between the treatment and control groups for firm size, investment
opportunities, shareholder intervention threat, and other important firm charac-
teristics associated with innovation. The only exception is that the treatment
firms are slightly younger than the control firms. Importantly, the growth rates
in innovation variables are similar between the treatment and control firms. The
growth rates in the number of total patents and in the number of highly-cited
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Table 2.6: Differences in Firm Characteristics between Treatment Firms and
Control Firms
The table reports the pairwise comparison between the treatment and control firms on important firm
characteristics, and their corresponding t-statistics. The sample comprises 206 treatment firms that
experienced exogenous change in shareholder intervention threat caused by the activist investor closures
between 2007 and 2010, and the same number of control firms. Treatment and control firms are matched
by calendar year, 3-digit SIC industry, total assets, Tobin’s Q, and shareholder intervention threat.
Growth rate of total patents and growth rate of highly-cited patents are calculated as the average
growth rate over the four years before activist investor closures.
Firm Characteristics Treatment Control Differences t-statistics
Assets, in billions 5.204 7.021 -1.817 -0.98
Firm Tobin’s Q 2.804 2.429 0.375 0.98
Activist Investor Ownership 0.111 0.105 0.006 0.73
Monitoring Investor Ownership 0.290 0.299 -0.009 -0.65
Analysts 11.311 12.273 -0.962 -1.18
ROA 0.004 0.011 -0.007 -0.20
CapExp / Assets 0.046 0.049 -0.003 -0.48
R&D / Assets 0.186 0.178 0.008 0.33
PPE / Assets 0.215 0.193 0.022 0.93
Leverage 0.316 0.262 0.054 1.20
KZIndex -18.914 -16.920 -1.994 -0.25
Firm Age 17.049 20.058 -3.009 -2.11
Herfindahl Index 0.196 0.199 -0.003 -0.17
Cash / Assets 0.309 0.313 -0.004 -0.16
Net Short-term Debt -0.267 -0.286 0.019 0.70
Growth Rate of Total Patents 0.033 0.031 0.002 0.03
Growth Rate of Highly-Cited Patents 0.051 0.033 0.018 0.22
patents are computed over the four years prior to the closure events. The data in
Table 2.6 confirm that the matching process has removed meaningful differences
among the treatment and control firms in the observable firm characteristics.
Identification requires that the activist investor closures should generate exoge-
nous variation in the levels of shareholder intervention threat (relevance condition).
Following activist investor closures, the total number of activist investors within
a firm declined. When activist investors as a group have less ownership, they
will have less power to win an activism campaign. Thus, the intervention threat
imposed on firm management will decline after activist investor closures. I esti-
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mate the magnitude of the intervention threat change following activist investor
closures, and I examine the intervention threat level of a firm during the three
years before and the three years after the closure event year. The results from
difference-in-differences estimation show that the ownership of treatment firms
by activist investors decreased by 1.49 percentage points relative to control firms
(with a p-value of 0.019). Compared with the pre-closure intervention threat level
of the treatment group, activist investor closures caused a reduction of 13.4%
in intervention threat. Overall, activist investor closures led to an economically
important decrease in the threat of shareholder intervention.
2.6.3 The Effect of Activist Investor Closures on Firm Innovation
The difference-in-differences estimator (DiD) is applied to estimate changes in
firm innovation following exogenous changes in the threat of shareholder interven-
tion. The estimator removes common time trends that affect both treatment and
control firms, as well as biases that could be the result from permanent differences
between the two groups of firms. The key identifying assumption of DiD is that, in
the absence of the treatment, the average outcomes for the treatment and control
groups would have followed parallel paths over time.
Figure 2 illustrates the innovation paths of the treatment firms and control
firms over a nine-year period centered on the year of activist investor closures.
Panel A shows the changes in the number of total patents, and Panel B presents
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Figure 2: Innovation Paths of Treatment and Control Firms
Notes: This figure illustrates the innovation of treatment firms and control firms from four
years before activist investor closures to four years after the closure events. Panel A presents
the changes in the number of total patents surrounding activist investor closures, and Panel B
shows the changes in the number of highly-cited patents. For each year, I calculate the mean of
the innovation variables across treatment firms and across control firms, respectively. Treatment
group consists of 206 U.S. publicly-traded firms that experienced exogenous change in the level
of shareholder intervention threat due to activist investor closures between 2007 and 2010. The
control group includes 206 U.S. publicly-traded firms matched by calendar year, 3-digit SIC
industry, total assets, Tobin’s Q, and shareholder intervention threat, which did not experience
activist investor closures.
the changes in the number of highly-cited patents. In both panels, innovation is
averaged across the 206 treatment firms and across the 206 control firms for each
year. Year zero is the time of activist investor closures. As shown in both panels,
during the four years before the closure events, the treatment and control firms
follow a similar path until the onset of activist investor closures. Following activist
closures, the innovation of treatment firms increases significantly relative to the
control firms. In addition, as shown in Table 2.6, the growth rate of innovation
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is statistically identical across the treatment and control groups. The magni-
tudes of the differences (0.002 for total patents and 0.018 for highly-cited patents)
are economically small. In sum, the graph of innovation path and the pairwise
comparison of innovation growth rate suggest that the treatment firms and the
closely matched control firms satisfy the parallel trends assumption required for
difference-in-differences estimation.
The effect of activist investor closures on firm innovation is estimated using
(14):
ln(Innovationi,t) = α+β1Ii (Activist Closures) +β2Ii,t (Post) +β3Ii (Activist Closures)×Ii,t (Post)
+ γXi,t−1 + νk + µt + errori,t (14)
Here, subscripts i,t uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year
t. Innovationi,t represents innovation of firm i in year t. Ii (Activist Closures)
is an indicator variable equal to one if one or more of firm i’s activist institutional
investors closed their operations in the U.S. during 2007-2010. These activist in-
vestors hold at least 1% of the firm’s outstanding shares. Ii,t (Post) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the observation occurs after the year of activist investor
closures. Xi,t−1 is a vector of control variables. νk and µt represent industry and
year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β3 (the coefficient on the interaction
term Ii (Activist Closures) × Ii,t (Post), which is a DiD estimate of the average
effect of activist investor closures on firm innovation. Standard errors are clustered
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at the event (activist investor closure) level to account for the presence of serial
correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
The results from estimating (14) are reported in Table 2.7. I examine firm inno-
vation four years before and four years after the event of activist investor closures.
In Column (1), the dependent variable is ln (TotalPatentst). The coefficients as-
sociated with Ii (Activist Closures) × Ii,t (Post) are positive and significant at
the 5% level. These results suggest that, for an average firm that experiences
an exogenous decrease in intervention threat due to activist investor closures, the
firm’s patent applications increase by 22.8% over the four years after the closure
events. In Column (2), the dependent variable is ln (Highly-Cited Patentst). The
estimate of coefficient β3 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
The finding suggests that following activist investor closures, firms produce 25.4%
more influential patents relative to control firms. In both columns, the coefficients
on Ii (Activist Closures) are close to zero, implying that there is no significant
difference in firm innovation prior to activist investor closures between treatment
and control firms.10 Overall, these results confirm that an exogenous decrease
in shareholder intervention threat leads to improved innovation incentives among
firm managers.
I conduct a set of robustness tests using alternative matching method and
10
According to Meyer (1995), a large coefficient on Ii (Activist Closures) is an indication that standard errors are
understated due to the presence of a group effect in the error term. In my current study, the coefficients on
Ii (Activist Closures) are close to zero, suggesting that there is no significant group effect.
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Table 2.7: The Effects of Activist Investor Closures on Innovation
This table reports the difference-in-differences estimation on the effects of activist investor closures
on firm innovation. Treatment firms are the U.S. publicly-traded firms that experienced exogenous
change in the level of shareholder intervention threat due to activist investor closures between 2007 and
2010. Control firms are U.S. publicly-traded firms that were not affected by activist investor closures.
Treatment firms and control firms are matched by year, industry (3-digit SIC code), total assets, Tobin’s
Q, and shareholder intervention threat. I (ActivistClosures) is an indicator variable equal to one if one
or more of the firm’s activist institutional investors closed their operations in the U.S. during 2007-2010,
and zero otherwise. I (Post) is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation occurs after the year
of activist investor closures, and zero otherwise. I (Activist Closure) ×I (Post) is an interaction term
equal to one if the firm experienced activist investor closures and the observation is after the closure
event year, and zero otherwise. Control variables include ln (Assets), Tobin’s Q, ROA, CapExp / Assets,
PPE / Assets, Leverage, KZIndex, ln (Firm Age), Herfindahl Index, Herfindahl Index squared. Standard
errors are clustered at the event (activist investor closure) level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable ln (Total Patentst) ln (Highly-Cited Patentst)
(1) (2)
I (Activist Closure) -0.027 -0.018
(0.202) (0.172)
I (Post) -0.095 -0.156
(0.122) (0.114)
I (Activist Closure) ×I (Post) 0.228** 0.254***
(0.081) (0.068)
Constant -0.371 -0.160
(0.304) (0.295)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2888 2888
Adjusted R2 0.405 0.389
alternative selections of matching variables. The robustness test results are re-
ported in Appendix Table A3. First, I use propensity score matching to select
control firms. The matching begins with a probit regression of an binary variable
that equals one if a firm experienced one or more activist investor closures in a
particular year (belongs to the treatment group) on a set of firm characteristics.
Specifically, I include activist investor ownership, firm size (logarithm of total as-
sets), Tobin’s Q, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The pseudo-R2 of
the probit regression is 0.16 with a p-value well below 0.001, which implies that
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the specification captures a significant amount of variation in the binary variable.
Then I perform a nearest-neighbor match with replacement using the predicted
probabilities (propensity scores) from the probit regression. For each treatment
firm, I select one control firm that is from the same year and 3-digit SIC industry,
and that has the closest propensity score. The DiD estimation results based on
propensity score matching are reported in Panel A of Appendix Table A3. The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline DiD estimation
(Table 2.7).
The estimation results on the effects of activist investor closures (Table 2.7)
are robust to alternative selections of matching variables. As discussed in Section
2.3.2, firm manager’s response to intervention threat change is conditional on the
extent of shareholder monitoring and analyst following. I include these variables
as additional matching variables. Panel B of Appendix Table A3 reports the DiD
results. The treatment effects are positive and statistically significant, consistent
with the hypothesis that firm innovation significantly improves following activist
investor closures. Moreover, a firm’s response to intervention threat change may
depend on the firm’s pre-closure innovation level, which reflects a firm’s innovation
resources. I include a firm’s total number of patent applications, averaged over
the three years prior to closure, as an additional matching criterion to the primary
matching variables (year, 3-digit SIC industry, total assets, Tobin’s Q, and inter-
vention threat level). The results are reported in Panel C of Appendix Table A3.
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The estimated treatment effects of activist investor closures remain positive and
significant. In addition, I use Hoberg-Phillips industry classification (Hoberg and
Phillips, 2010, 2016) to replace the 3-digit SIC industry in the primary matching
variables. Hoberg-Phillips industry classification is based on the relatedness of
firms in the product market space. Panel D of Appendix Table A3 presents the
DiD estimation results. The estimated treatment effects are similar to the baseline
DiD results (Table 2.7), although the significance level for the treatment effect on
Total Patents (Column (1)) declines slightly.
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), I investigate in greater detail the
dynamic effects of activist investor closures on firm innovation (see Table 2.8). The
interaction term Ii (Activist Closures) × Ii,t (Post) in equation (14) is replaced
with the interaction of Ii (Activist Closures) with nine time indicators. Before
(-4), Before (-3), Before (-2), and Before (-1) are the dummy variables that equal
one if the firm-year observation is before activist investor closures (4 years before,
3 years before, 2 years before, and 1 year before, respectively), and zero otherwise.
Event Year (0) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm-year observation is
on the year that activist investor closure events occur, and zero otherwise. After
(+1), After (+2), After (+3) and After (+4) are dummy variables equal to one
if the firm-year observation is after activist investor closures (1 year after, 2 years
after, 3 years after, and 4 years after, respectively) and zero otherwise.
One reverse causality concern is that activist investor closures may be driven
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Table 2.8: Dynamic Analysis of the Effects of Activist Investor Closures
This table reports the estimation results on the dynamic effects of activist investor closures on firm
innovation. I (ActivistClosures) is an indicator variable equal to one if one or more of the firm’s
activist institutional investors closed their funds. Before (-3), Before (-2), and Before (-1) are the
dummy variables indicating that the firm-year observation is 3 years, 2 years, or 1 year before activist
investor closures. Event Year (0) is a dummy that equals one if the firm-year observation is on the
year in which activist investor closures occur. After (+1), After (+2), After (+3) and After (+4) are
dummy variables indicating that the firm-year observation is 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, or 4 years after
activist investor closures. Control variables include ln (Assets), Tobin’s Q, ROA, CapExp / Assets,
PPE / Assets, Leverage, KZIndex, ln (Firm Age), Herfindahl Index, Herfindahl Index squared. Year
and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the event (activist investor
closure) level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable ln (Total Patentst) ln (Highly-Cited Patentst)
(1) (2)
I (Activist Closure) -0.018 -0.032
(0.190) (0.169)
I (Activist Closure) × Before (-3) 0.014 -0.017
(0.058) (0.058)
I (Activist Closure) × Before (-2) -0.035 0.032
(0.069) (0.061)
I (Activist Closure) × Before (-1) -0.019 0.031
(0.063) (0.053)
I (Activist Closure) × Event Year (0) -0.022 0.120
(0.068) (0.069)
I (Activist Closure) × After (+1) 0.016 0.168**
(0.077) (0.058)
I (Activist Closure) × After (+2) 0.185*** 0.242***
(0.051) (0.054)
I (Activist Closure) × After (+3) 0.322** 0.392**
(0.144) (0.141)
I (Activist Closure) × After (+4) 0.498** 0.320**
(0.204) (0.112)
Constant -0.273 -0.114
(0.296) (0.301)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 3648 3648
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.401
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by the poor innovation performance of these investors’ portfolio firms. If this
was indeed the case, then we should observe a significant difference in the in-
novation trend of treatment and control firms in the years preceding activist
investor closures. In fact, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms
Ii (Activist Closures)×Before (-3), Ii (Activist Closures)×Before (-2), and
Ii (Activist Closures)×Before (-1) are statistically indistinguishable from zero. It
shows that the treatment effect cannot be found prior to the closures of activist in-
vestors. This implies that innovation performance is unlikely to be the reason that
activist investors closed their funds. Significant changes in innovation are observed
in the subsequent years following the closure events. The estimated coefficients on
Ii (Activist Closures)× After (+2) are significant at 1% level, and the coefficients
on Ii (Activist Closures)×After (+3) and Ii (Activist Closures)×After (+4) are
significant at 5% level. Overall, these results provide evidence supporting the
causal interpretation of the effects of activist investor closures on firm innovation.
Most of the activist investor closures occurred during the financial crisis period.
One potential concern is that the financial crisis differentially affected the treat-
ment firms and control firms, which leads to differential innovation performance.
I further investigate whether this was the case. Campello, Graham, and Harvey
(2010) suggest that financially constrained firms are affected more by the financial
crisis of 2008, and are more likely to bypass attractive investment opportunities. I
test whether financial constraints change significantly for treatment firms relative
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Table 2.9: Difference-in-Differences Tests for Financial Constraints, Internal
Financial Resources, and Short-term Liquidity
This table tests whether treatment and control firms differ in financial constraints, internal financial
resources, and short-term liquidity around activist investor closures. Financial constraints is measured
using Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index (KZIndex). Internal financial resources is proxied by Cash/Assets.
Short-term Liquidity is measured using Net Short-term Debt (short-term debt minus cash). Difference-
in-Differences estimator is applied. Standard errors are clustered at the event (activist investor closure)
level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Financial Constraints Internal Financial
Resources
Short-term Liquidity
Dependent Variable KZIndex Cash/Assets Net Short-term Debt
(1) (2) (3)
I (Activist Closure) -9.162 0.027 -0.050
(6.781) (0.031) (0.036)
I (Post) 3.544 0.011 -0.095**
(9.932) (0.015) (0.033)
I (Activist Closure) ×I (Post) 7.837 -0.001 0.075
(11.698) (0.009) (0.049)
Constant -9.848** 0.280*** -0.243***
(4.494) (0.018) (0.023)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2302 2376 2376
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.571 0.076
to control firms surrounding activist investor closures. The presence of financial
constraints is measured using the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index (KZIndex). Prior
to activist investor closures, KZIndex is not statistically different between treat-
ment firms and control firms (Table 2.6). To test whether treatment and control
firms have differential financial constraints following activist investor closures, I
conduct a difference-in-differences test using financial constraints as the dependent
variable. In Table 2.9 Column (1) I present the estimation results. The treatment
effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero, which implies that financial con-
straints do not change differentially for treatment group relative to control group.
During the financial crisis, it is plausible that firms may rely more on internal
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financing. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that internal financial resources
mitigate the negative shocks to the supply of external finance during financial
crisis, and corporate investment declines less for firms with more cash reserves.
I test whether treatment and control firms differ in their cash reserve positions.
Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy further show that during financial crises, investment
declines significantly for firms that lack short-term liquidity (measured by net
short-term debt). I also test whether treatment and control firms have differential
short-term liquidity around the time of activist investor closures. As shown in
Table 2.6, Cash/Assets and Net Short-term Debt are not statistically different be-
tween treatment firms and control firms before activist investor closures. Again, I
perform difference-in-differences tests using cash reserve and net short-term debt
as dependent variables, and the results are reported in Columns (2) and (3) of
Table 2.9. The treatment effects are not statistically significant, implying that
treatment and control firms do not have differential cash reserves and short-term
liquidity around activist investor closures. The three difference-in-differences es-
timations reported in Table 2.9 use a seven-year window, with three years before
and three years after the activist investor closures. The results are robust to al-
ternative shorter or longer windows. Detailed variable definitions for KZIndex ,
Cash/Assets and Net Short-term Debt are provided in Appendix Table A1. I con-
clude that treatment firms and control firms have similar financial constraints,
internal financial resources, and short-term liquidity. Thus, it is not likely that
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the financial crisis has a differential impact on treatment firms relative to con-
trol firms. The significant effects of activist investor closures on innovation (as
observed in Table 2.7) is not driven by the financial crisis.
2.7. Conclusion
The main finding of this research is that increasing the threat of shareholder
intervention has a significant and economically important negative impact on firm
innovation. It implies that shifting to a shareholder-centric governance system
discourages manager incentives to innovate. Pursuing innovation is often associ-
ated with less precise information reflected in stock prices, which increases the
likelihood that a good manager with valuable innovation projects will be mistak-
enly penalized. Thus, firm managers under the threat of shareholder intervention,
often refrain from pursuing innovation. Yet, for firms that are more likely to have
efficient stock prices, the threat of activist intervention will have less effect on
firm innovation. Consistent with this mechanism, I find that the negative effects
of intervention threat on innovation are significantly reduced when a firm’s shares
are held by more monitoring institutional investors and/or the firm is followed by
more financial analysts. This research has important policy implications. It sug-
gests that corporate governance reform should consider the impacts of shareholder
control on innovation of U.S. publicly-traded firms.
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Appendix Table A2: Shareholder Intervention Threat and Innovation, Robustness
Check
This table reports the robustness check on the effects of shareholder intervention threat on firm inno-
vation using alternative measures of intervention threat. In Panel A, the main explanatory variable
Intervention Threat is measured based on the ownership of the activist institutional investors who own
more than 1% of firm outstanding shares. In Panel B, Intervention Threat is measured based on the
ownership of the activist institutional investors who own more than 5% of firm outstanding shares.
Firm fixed effects are controlled using the “presample mean scaling” method, following the procedure
in Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999). Robust standard errors clustered by firm are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Activist Institutional Investors with More than 1% Ownership
Model OLS OLS
Negative
Binomial
Negative Binomial
Dependent
Variable
ln (Total
Patentst+2)
ln (Highly-Cited
Patentst+2)
Total Patentst+2
Highly-Cited
Patentst+2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intervention
Threat
-0.993*** -0.829*** -1.245*** -0.939**
(0.310) (0.275) (0.421) (0.466)
ln (Assets) 0.288*** 0.219*** 0.499*** 0.457***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026)
Industry Q 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
ROA -0.075 -0.053 -0.301*** -0.227**
(0.063) (0.054) (0.097) (0.109)
CapExp / Assets 2.171*** 1.834*** 3.394*** 3.604***
(0.381) (0.332) (0.581) (0.644)
PPE / Assets -0.429*** -0.313** -0.885*** -0.868***
(0.153) (0.131) (0.224) (0.246)
Leverage -0.249*** -0.210*** -0.270*** -0.289***
(0.048) (0.042) (0.070) (0.079)
KZIndex -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln (Firm Age) -0.133*** -0.105*** -0.226*** -0.236***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.043) (0.047)
Herfindahl Index -0.569 -0.490 -0.599 -0.548
(0.387) (0.344) (0.550) (0.595)
Herfindahl Index 2 0.180 0.213 -0.199 -0.241
(0.438) (0.385) (0.623) (0.660)
Constant -0.279* -0.349*** -1.994*** -2.307***
(0.142) (0.127) (0.555) (0.562)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13414 13414 13414 13414
73
Appendix Table A2 (Continued)
Panel B: Activist Institutional Investors with More than 5% Ownership
Model OLS OLS
Negative
Binomial
Negative Binomial
Dependent
Variable
ln (Total
Patentst+2)
ln (Highly-Cited
Patentst+2)
Total Patentst+2
Highly-Cited
Patentst+2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intervention
Threat
-0.987*** -0.851*** -1.329*** -1.142**
(0.332) (0.293) (0.439) (0.481)
ln (Assets) 0.286*** 0.217*** 0.497*** 0.456***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026)
Industry Q 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
ROA -0.077 -0.054 -0.305*** -0.230**
(0.063) (0.054) (0.097) (0.109)
CapExp / Assets 2.168*** 1.830*** 3.398*** 3.602***
(0.381) (0.333) (0.584) (0.646)
PPE / Assets -0.424*** -0.309** -0.878*** -0.863***
(0.153) (0.131) (0.225) (0.247)
Leverage -0.250*** -0.211*** -0.271*** -0.289***
(0.048) (0.042) (0.070) (0.079)
KZIndex -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln (Firm Age) -0.134*** -0.105*** -0.227*** -0.237***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.043) (0.047)
Herfindahl Index -0.567 -0.489 -0.596 -0.549
(0.388) (0.345) (0.551) (0.596)
Herfindahl Index 2 0.181 0.214 -0.199 -0.240
(0.439) (0.386) (0.624) (0.662)
Constant -0.294** -0.360*** -1.994*** -2.307***
(0.143) (0.127) (0.553) (0.560)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13414 13414 13414 13414
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Appendix Table A3: The Effects of Activist Investor Closures on Innovation,
Robustness Check
This table reports the robustness check on the estimated effects of activist investor closures on firm
innovation (Table 5). Panel A presents the results using propensity score matching. Panels B, C, and D
report the results using alternative matching variables. In Panel B, treatment firms and control firms are
matched by year, industry (3-digit SIC), total assets, Tobin’s Q, intervention threat level, shareholder
monitoring, and financial analysts. In Panel C, treatment firms and control firms are matched by year,
industry (3-digit SIC), total assets, Tobin’s Q, intervention threat level, and pre-closure innovation
level. In Panel D, treatment firms and control firms are matched by year, industry, total assets, Tobin’s
Q, and intervention threat level. Hoberg-Phillips industry classification is used to replace 3-digit SIC
industry. Standard errors are clustered at the event (activist investor closure) level, and are displayed
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences Estimation, Propensity Score Matching
Dependent Variable ln (Total Patentst) ln (Highly-Cited Patentst)
(1) (2)
I (Activist Closure) -0.218 -0.140
(0.132) (0.113)
I (Post)t 0.064 -0.033
(0.056) (0.062)
I (Activist Closure) ×I
(Post)t
0.198** 0.278***
(0.070) (0.074)
Constant -0.788* -0.586*
(0.375) (0.317)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2827 2827
Adjusted R2 0.470 0.440
Panel B: Difference-in-Differences Estimation, Using Shareholder Monitoring and Analyst
Following as Additional Matching Variables
Dependent Variable ln (Total Patentst) ln (Highly-Cited Patentst)
(1) (2)
I (Activist Closure) -0.195 -0.111
(0.213) (0.174)
I (Post)t -0.333*** -0.368***
(0.079) 0.081)
I (Activist Closure) ×I
(Post)t
0.267** 0.425***
(0.116) (0.121)
Constant -0.280 -1.191**
(0.426) (0.372)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2891 2891
Adjusted R2 0.417 0.382
75
Appendix Table A3 (Continued)
Panel C: Difference-in-Differences Estimation, Using Pre-Closure Innovation Level as
Additional Matching Variable
Dependent Variable ln (Total Patentst) ln (Highly-Cited Patentst)
(1) (2)
I (Activist Closure) -0.039 0.055
(0.080) (0.074)
I (Post)t -0.164 -0.158
(0.139) (0.139)
I (Activist Closure) ×I
(Post)t
0.315** 0.290***
(0.113) (0.084)
Constant -0.093 -0.768*
(0.423) (0.367)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2883 2883
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.392
Panel D: Difference-in-Differences Estimation, Matching Based on Hoberg-Phillips Industry
Classification
Dependent Variable ln (Total Patentst) ln (Highly-Cited Patentst)
(1) (2)
I (Activist Closure) -0.128 -0.025
(0.193) (0.186)
I (Post)t -0.070 -0.119***
(0.129) (0.120)
I (Activist Closure) ×I
(Post)t
0.182* 0.254***
(0.092) (0.074)
Constant -0.606** -0.563**
(0.245) (0.213)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2757 2757
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.417
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Chapter 3
Derivative Litigation and Board Effectiveness:
Evidence from Delaware’s Judicially-led Reforms
in 2003
3.1. Introduction
In the post-Enron era, the boards of directors of publicly-traded companies face
greater scrutiny, and an increased possibility of being challenged in a courtroom.
At the federal level, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increases the oversight du-
ties of boards of directors. At the state level, tougher judicial opinions from the
Delaware courts have heightened the standards for evaluating director conduct.
These initiatives have limited the traditional protections for directors. With the
heightened scrutiny, directors may find it more difficult to dismiss derivative law-
suits challenging their actions. An important question is: How does this shift
in the legal environment and the increased litigation threat for directors, affect
board of director behavior? This question is important because boards of directors
play a central role in corporate governance, and examining their responses to legal
and judicial reforms can help scholars, regulators, and practitioners evaluate the
effectiveness of various legislative and regulatory initiatives to improve corporate
governance practices.
In this research, I focus on Delaware court judicial decisions related to corporate
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governance litigation.11 Delaware plays a prominent role in corporate law, as
more than 50% of publicly-traded companies in the United States, and over 60%
of the Fortune 500 companies, are incorporated in the State of Delaware. In
2003, the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court adjusted
their corporate law jurisprudence, conferring less judicial deference to director
business judgment. The courts lowered their procedural hurdles to derivative
litigation, allowing more shareholder derivative lawsuits to survive pretrial motions
to dismiss.
Shareholder litigation can take the form of derivative suits and direct suits. A
derivative lawsuit is an action brought by a corporate shareholder on behalf of
the corporation to enforce a corporate right that the officers and directors of the
corporation have failed to enforce. The lawsuit is “derivative” because only the
corporation has the right to sue its directors and officers, and shareholders may
sue these parties on behalf of the corporation only if the corporation refuses to
redress the harm on the corporation. Direct lawsuit, which is either individual
or class-action, is brought by shareholders in their own right, to redress harms
inflicted on the particular shareholders. The financial incentives and procedural
mechanisms differ for the two types of lawsuit (Clark, 1986). Ferris et al. (2007)
commented that derivative lawsuits are better suited than class action lawsuits to
11
Clark (2005) states that in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, corporate governance in the American public
corporations were affected by “four sources of policy change — the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, new listing requirements,
governance rating agencies, and tougher judicial opinions (notably in Delaware) about perennial corporate gov-
ernance issues (p.251).”
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examine how shareholder litigation rights affect corporate governance. In deriva-
tive litigation, plaintiff shareholders act in the interests of all shareholders, and
thus are more likely to address agency problems that exist between shareholders
and management.
A major procedural hurdle to derivative litigation is the demand requirement
that stockholders make a pre-suit demand to the board to initiate the suit, or
alternatively demonstrate with “particularized facts” that the demand would be
a futile gesture. Since 2003, Delaware courts have liberalized Section 220 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), which permits shareholders to in-
spect corporate books and records. The courts encouraged shareholders to use
Section 220 rights to obtain “particularized facts” for pleading demand futility.
Another major procedural hurdle to derivative litigation is the special litiga-
tion committee (SLC), made up of the board’s independent directors. The SLC
makes pretrial investigation of the lawsuit and determines whether continuing the
litigation is in the best interest of the corporation. The Delaware courts imposed
more restrictive standards of SLC independence, and gave less deference to SLC’s
recommendation of dismissal of the suit. Lowering these procedural hurdles em-
powered shareholders to seek derivative litigation against corporate directors.
Since 2003, Delaware’s courts have permitted many more derivative lawsuits
to proceed. In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the court challenged
the business judgment of directors in a duty of care case. In In re Oracle Corp.
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Derivative Litigation, the court refused to defer to the recommendation of a spe-
cial litigation committee (SLC). These cases would have been dismissed prior to
the 2001-2002 scandals. Frieswick commented that “the court’s willingness to
hear them may encourage disgruntled shareholders of other companies to test the
protections of the business-judgment rule” (CFO Magazine, February 19, 2004).
Jones (2004) states that the main reason for the jurisprudential shift in Delaware
is the threat of federal preemption. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the
Delaware judiciary was mindful of Congress’s preemptive power, and the possibil-
ity that uniform federal standards could erode Delaware’s appeal as a legal home
for business entities, which may lead to significant loss of franchise tax revenue. In
response, Delaware courts took the initiative to reform its state’s corporate law,
increasing scrutiny of director liability for the breach of fiduciary duty, to forestall
further federal preemption.
Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003 provide a valuable opportunity for re-
searchers to examine the effects of derivative litigation on corporate governance.
In the United States, corporate law in all states grants shareholders the right to
vote, sell, and sue (Thompson, 1999). Corresponding to these rights, shareholders
can potentially exert governance through three main mechanisms. The first is
shareholder intervention (also known as “voice”), which includes electing corpo-
rate directors, voting against mergers, proxy fights, etc. The second main avenue
for shareholders to exert governance is disciplinary trading (also known as “exit”
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or “Wall Street Walk”), where shareholders sell a company’s shares, pushing down
the stock price. The third main governance mechanism is shareholder litigation.
While most research on shareholder governance has focused on intervention and
disciplinary trading, the corporate governance effect of shareholder litigation has
been largely ignored in the literature. The traditional view on shareholder litiga-
tion is that the role of shareholder litigation in corporate governance is limited,
because the business judgment rule effectively shields corporate directors and offi-
cers from exposure to liability. Delaware courts’ judicial decisions in 2003 departed
dramatically from the traditions of director and management deference that pre-
ceded Enron (Jones, 2004). The jurisprudential change empowered shareholders
to pursue derivative litigation. Thus, shareholder litigation becomes an important
arena for shareholders to exert influence over corporate governance.
I exploit the jurisprudential shift in Delaware to test the effects of derivative
litigation on corporate governance. The judicially-led reforms in Delaware gen-
erate an exogenous change in the threat of derivative litigation facing Delaware
corporations. I examine the effectiveness of boards of directors in monitoring the
chief executive officers (CEO) in publicly-traded firms around the 2003 reforms.
Using a difference-in-differences method, I compare firms incorporated in Delaware
with those incorporated in other states from the pre-reform period (2000-2002) to
the post-reform period (2003-2005). I find that empowering shareholders to pur-
sue derivative actions largely improves board effectiveness. Specifically, boards of
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directors make more effective decisions on CEO compensation and replacement.
The empirical results show that following the Delaware’s judicially-led reforms,
Delaware corporations exhibit higher CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity than
non-Delaware firms. The results imply that the threat of derivative litigation in-
centivizes directors to monitor CEO pay and design compensation contracts that
motivate top management to create shareholder value. In addition, I find that
subsequent to the Delaware reforms, Delaware firms show greater sensitivity of
CEO turnover to firm performance. This result suggests that derivative litigation
motivates directors to align with shareholders and enforce discipline on poorly-
performing management. Overall, my findings provide evidence that derivative
litigation has economically important effects on corporate governance practice.
Shareholder litigation can serve as an effective mechanism for shareholders to ex-
ert governance.
This study is related to two recent papers on the effects of derivative litigation
on corporate governance. Ferris et al. (2007) examine the change in board char-
acteristics surrounding the filings of derivative lawsuits. They find that following
derivative litigation, the proportion of outside directors increases, board size de-
creases, and fewer CEOs continue to hold the position of board chairman. These
board characteristics are associated with good corporate governance in literature.
Appel (2015) examines the staggered adoption of universal demand law in 23 states
between 1989 and 2005. The universal demand (UD) law requires shareholders to
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make demand in every derivative lawsuit, thus imposing a significant obstacle to
derivative litigation. He finds that the adoption of universal demand law leads to
increased use of governance provisions that increase management entrenchment
and limit shareholder voice. My research is based on the Delaware’s judicially-
led reforms in 2003, which empowered shareholders to exert governance through
their litigation rights. I document that following the reforms, boards of directors
are more effective in monitoring CEOs. In general, my study, along with those
two papers, supports the view that derivative litigation is an important corporate
governance mechanism.
This paper also differs from Appel (2015) in two aspects. First, Appel (2015) is
focused on the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, and his em-
pirical analysis shows that weakening shareholder litigation rights leads to an in-
crease in management entrenchment, and impaired firm performance. My research
examines how shareholder litigation rights affect the incentives and effectiveness
of boards of directors to perform governance functions. I find that empowering
shareholders to pursue derivative litigation leads to improved board incentives to
monitor CEO and more effective decisions on CEO compensation and replace-
ment. Second, Appel (2015) relies on the adoption of universal demand (UD)
laws to identify the effects of derivative litigation on corporate governance. This
research design is very innovative, but it has limitations. The influence of the
UD laws may be limited, as the laws only affected the states that not many com-
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panies are incorporated. The majority of the publicly-traded companies in the
United States are incorporate in the states of Delaware or New York, where the
UD laws were not adopted. My paper replies on Delaware’s judicially-led reforms
as an exogenous shock to shareholder power to pursue derivative litigation. Given
Delaware’s prominent role in American corporate law, the judicially-led reforms in
2003 had a far-reaching impact on shareholder litigation rights. As more than 50%
of publicly-traded companies in the United States are incorporated in the State
of Delaware, the reforms in Delaware corporate law generate sufficient variation
in litigation rights among U.S. companies. The empirical results based on this
design provide important evidence on the effects of shareholder litigation rights
on corporate governance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I review
Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003. In section 3.3, I formulate my hypotheses
on the effects of derivative litigation on board effectiveness. I describe data and
variable measurement in section 3.4, and employ difference-in-differences method
to test the governance effects of derivative litigation in section 3.5. I conclude the
chapter in section 3.6.
3.2. Institutional Background on Delaware’s Judicially-led
Reforms in 2003
The 2001-2002 corporate scandals, typified by Enron and WorldCom, evoked
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broad public criticism of the existing corporate regulatory regime. Scholars and
business lawyers challenged that the state courts had always granted judicial def-
erence to corporate directors and officers, and provided few effective means for
shareholders to redress corporate wrongdoing. The need for legal reform became
glaringly apparent. The federal government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002, which has been generally considered as the most far reaching reform of
American business practices since the Securities Act of 1933.
Delaware is at the center of corporate law in America. Delaware’s courts, in re-
sponse to the widespread corporate scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adjusted
its corporate law jurisprudence, moving to a more restrictive application of the
business judgment rule and more vigorous enforcement of officers’ and directors’
fiduciary duties (Jones, 2004). In this section, I review the details of Delaware’s
judicially-led reforms in 2003.
Before the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Delaware built a reputation as
the most management-friendly state.12 Delaware’s courts had reinforced substan-
tive limitations on director liability by imposing procedural barriers to litigation
against them. The two most significant procedural hurdles that shareholder plain-
tiffs face are the demand requirement and the special litigation committee (SLC)
device. Prior to instituting a derivative action, shareholder plaintiffs must make
a demand on the corporation’s directors to enforce a corporate right (e.g. sue the
12
Jones (2004) comments that “Before Enron, Delaware was the state where managers turned for assurances of
minimal exposure to personal liability for mistakes, misjudgments, wrongdoing, or self-dealing.”
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directors or executive officers for breach of fiduciary duties). Once the demand
is rejected by directors, the burden is on the plaintiff shareholders to show that
the Board wrongfully refused the plaintiff’s pre-suit demand. The courts gen-
erally review the Board’s decision under the deferential business judgment rule
and rarely second guess the Board’s decision. Alternatively, plaintiff shareholders
can demonstrate that the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision
regarding the litigation, so the demand is futile and would be excused.
In Delaware, Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 requires that allegations of demand
futility must comply with stringent requirements of “factual particularity”. Under
the Aronson test, a demand is excused if the alleged particularized facts create a
reasonable doubt that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent, and
(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment. If either condition is satisfied, demand is excused and the case
may proceed. A common complaint from plaintiff shareholders is that the system
of requiring a shareholder plaintiff to plead particularized facts for establishing
demand futility is basically unfair because Delaware’s courts do not permit dis-
covery. Even if the plaintiff shareholders succeed in showing that demand should
be excused as futile, directors have an additional opportunity to avoid litigation.
They can appoint a special litigation committee (SLC), made up of independent
and disinterested directors, to consider whether the corporation should proceed
with litigation. The committee almost always concluded that continuing the suit
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was against the corporation’s interest and recommended dismissal of the lawsuit.
Delaware’s courts typically deferred to the business judgment of the SLC. Overall,
the demand requirement and the SLC made it virtually impossible for shareholders
to challenge directors’ decision making through derivative litigation.
This situation changed dramatically in 2003. The Delaware Supreme Court
made “pro-shareholder moves” (Subramanian, 2003) and lowered the procedural
hurdles to derivative litigation. The Court, through their judicial opinions, encour-
aged shareholder plaintiffs to pursue a Section 220 action to uncover the facts that
would allow them to establish demand futility. Section 220 of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law (DGCL) permits stockholders to inspect corporate books
and records for any “proper purpose” and provides for enforcement of that right
by the Court of Chancery. To facilitate shareholder plaintiff’s discovery of partic-
ular facts, Delaware amended Section 220 of the DGCL in 2003. The amendment
extends the right of inspection from record owners to beneficial owners13 of a cor-
poration’s stock, and permits inspection of the books and records of subsidiaries,
including non-Delaware subsidiaries, of Delaware corporations. Radin (2006) com-
mented that the Section 220 of DGCL marks a new stage of corporate governance
litigation.
In 2003 and afterward, Delaware’s courts have made a series of judicial deci-
13
A record owner or registered owner holds shares directly with the company. A beneficial owner holds shares
indirectly, through a bank or broker-dealer. The majority of U.S investors own their securities as beneficial
owners.
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sions that imposed stricter judicial standards for evaluating director conduct. The
Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2003 decision in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation14 is one of the most important decisions. The initial Disney lawsuit was
filed in 1998 and alleged a general breach of duty on the part of the directors. The
Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed all of the shareholder plaintiffs’ claims.
The court stated that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the demand requirement, because
the case was not supported by particularized facts or meaningful discovery. In
2003, the shareholder plaintiffs repleaded demand futility using Section 220 action
to obtain sufficient facts about the actions of the Disney board. The shareholder
established that the Board of Directors failed to oversee the hiring of Michael
Ovitz as president of Disney in October 1995. Michael Eisner, the CEO of Disney,
unilaterally hired his close friend Michael Ovitz. The Board of Directors and the
Compensation Committee approved the hiring in less than an hour on the same
day it was first presented. Both committees saw only a rough, incomplete sum-
mary of the employment agreement, received no expert advice on the agreement,
and approved it without seeing a final version. The Board of Directors, which met
immediately after the Compensation Committee, asked no questions about salary
or termination terms. Instead, the board delegated authority to Ovitz and Eis-
ner to work out the terms of the agreement, which were generous. The Delaware
Chancery Court concluded that the alleged facts created a reasonable doubt as to
whether the directors acted honestly and in good faith, and the Court refused to
14See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003)
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dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against the Disney directors. The judicial decisions
on the Disney case in 2003 depart sharply from the rulings in 1998.
The second case that exemplifies the trend toward stricter judicial standards is
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation.15 This case was decided by the Delaware
Court of Chancery in June 2003. In March 2001, Oracle announced significantly
lower-than-expected earnings and license revenue growth. As a result, the Oracle
stock price dropped dramatically. Two months earlier, four Oracle directors sold
a considerable amount of their Oracle common stock. The shareholders sued the
four Oracle directors, including its Chairman and CEO Larry Ellison, for breach-
ing their duty of loyalty by engaging in insider trading. The defendant directors
then formed a special litigation committee (SLC), made up of two independent
directors, to investigate the derivative suit. The SLC produced a 1,100-page re-
port, concluding that the defendants did not have material nonpublic information
before they traded their shares, and recommending termination of the derivative
suit.
The Court of Chancery dissected the social and professional connections be-
tween SLC members and the defendant directors. Two SLC members, Joseph
Grundfest and Hector Molina-Garcia, were Stanford University professors and
alumni. The defendant directors include Michael Boskin, who was a former eco-
nomics professor at Stanford, and William Lucas, who had contributed almost
$16 million to Stanford. In addition, the CEO Larry Ellison has made more than
15See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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$10 million in donations to Stanford in the past and was in current negotiations
with Stanford about a potential $170 million donation. The Court of Chancery
concluded that the SLC was not sufficiently independent to evaluate the plain-
tiffs’ claim, and refused to defer to the SLC’s recommendation. The Oracle case
survived the motion to dismiss. This ruling departs from previous Delaware deci-
sions, which had focused on material economic relationships and would not have
questioned the SLC’s independence based on “personal and other relationships”
between defendant directors and SLC members. Therefore, the Oracle decision in-
dicates that the Delaware courts increased their standards for SLC independence,
and heightened its scrutiny on the application of the business judgment rule.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Delaware judiciary took the ini-
tiative to reform its state’s corporate law and imposed stricter judicial standards
for evaluating director conduct in 2003. As The Economist commented, “Reacting
to the latest anti-business sentiment in Washington, DC, Delaware’s judges appear
ready to adopt a more hawkish line on the duty of directors to represent share-
holders’ interests (October 25, 2003).” This jurisprudential shift in 2003 indicates
that the shareholders of Delaware corporations are more able to pursue derivative
action to affect corporate governance.16
16
Jones (2004) states that Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003 is a response to the preemptive threat of
federal legislature. As the federal preemptive threat recedes over time, Delaware judiciary can relax its restrictive
standards of director conduct. The Chancery Court’s 2005 decisions in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation exonerated all of the Disney defendants from liability. In the Oracle case, the court ultimately favored
the defendants.
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3.3. Hypothesis Development
Shareholders may use their litigation rights to exert influence over corporate
governance. To what extent can shareholders rely on derivative litigation to im-
prove corporate governance? Prior literature points to the limitations of derivative
litigation as a governance mechanism. First, all states allow corporations to pur-
chase directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), which provides
them with protections against legal liability. Romano (1991) shows that most
shareholder lawsuits are settled, in which D&O insurers pay the settlement and
a firm’s rising insurance premium is borne by all of the shareholders. Lin, Of-
ficer, and Zou (2011) demonstrate that D&O insurance reduces the incentive of
directors and managers to act in the best interest of shareholders in mergers and
acquisitions, as the D&O insurance insulates them from shareholder litigation and
financial liability. These research findings imply that the prevailing D&O insur-
ance has restricted the disciplinary role of shareholder litigation.
Second, shareholders who pursue derivative litigation face a variety of proce-
dural and substantive restrictions. As discussed in Section 2, the demand require-
ment and the device of special litigation committee make it virtually impossible
for shareholders to pursue derivative litigation. In fact, in 1990s only a small
number of cases survived pretrial motions to dismiss.
Third, the function of derivative litigation as a governance device is hampered
by collective action problem (Romano, 1991). Financial recoveries from derivative
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lawsuits usually go to the corporation. For individual shareholders, the pro rata
benefit from pursuing derivative litigation may not be enough to cover the cost
of bringing the lawsuit. These potential problems with derivative litigation lead
economics and law scholars to conclude that derivative litigation is an ineffective
instrument of corporate governance (Thompson and Thomas, 2004; Becht, Bolton,
and Röell 2003).
Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003 have dramatically changed firm’s liti-
gation environment. This shift in Delaware jurisprudence provides an opportunity
for researchers to reexamine the effects of derivative litigation on corporate gover-
nance. The Board of Directors is central to corporate governance. I examine how
the threat of derivative litigation affects the effectiveness of the Board of Directors
in performing its monitoring function. In particular, I evaluate whether the Board
sets up CEO compensation schemes that motivate the CEO to create shareholder
value. In addition, I examine whether the Board makes timely CEO replacement
decisions when firm stock returns decline.
The theoretical literature on corporate governance shows that building effec-
tive boards requires aligning the interests of directors with those of sharehold-
ers (Warther, 1998; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994). This alignment between the
Board and shareholders can be achieved through setting director compensation
and through exploiting the reputational concerns of the directors (John and Sen-
bet, 1998). Since the D&O insurance insulates directors from financial liability,
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director’s motivation to effectively monitor top management in the derivative lit-
igation context may come from their reputational concerns. Adams, Hermalin,
and Weisbach (2010) state that directors’ reputation is particularly important
in the market for directorships, and reputation concerns largely affect director
actions. Fama and Jensen (1983) show that directors have incentives to develop
reputations as decision experts, and their reputation concern motivates them to be
effective monitors. Shareholder litigation can severely damage directors’ reputa-
tion and career opportunities. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) document
that directors experience a significant decline in the number of board seats they
hold in other companies following financial fraud lawsuits. Similarly, Brochet and
Srinivasan (2014) show that when a director is subject to securities class-action
lawsuits, the director receives more negative recommendations from Institutional
Shareholder Services, a proxy advisor firm, and is more likely to lose his/her seat
in director elections. When Delaware’s judicially-led reforms increase the threat
of derivative litigation, reputation concerns may motivate directors to take more
effort to fulfill their monitoring duties.
Moreover, the literature on director incentives recognizes a potential reputa-
tional trade-off. Although shareholders elect directors, firm management has im-
portant influence over the director-nominating process. CEOs who are looking to
acquire power often favor directors who are unlikely to rock the boat. Thus, direc-
tors who gain reputation for monitoring and replacing a firm’s CEO may receive
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less nominations at other companies where the CEO has strong control. Levit and
Malenko (2016) show that whether a director is willing to develop a shareholder-
friendly or management-friendly reputation depends on the aggregate quality of
corporate governance. If more firms in an economy exhibit strong shareholder
control, a shareholder-friendly reputation will be rewarded more in the directorial
labor market. As a result, directors will have more incentives to build a reputation
for being shareholder-friendly. Delaware’s judicial reforms in 2003 uphold share-
holder litigation rights and enhance shareholder power in corporate governance.
As shareholder power increases relative to that of management in Delaware cor-
porations, shareholder-friendly reputation would be more valuable for directors.
This would motivate directors to develop a reputation of shareholder-friendliness
by performing the function of monitoring and disciplining management.
Based on the analysis of director’s reputational concerns, I propose that higher
likelihood of derivative litigation leads to a more effective Board of Directors. To
measure board effectiveness, I examine board decisions on CEO compensation
and CEO replacement. Designing CEO compensation schemes is one of the major
functions of the Board of Directors. Effective boards are expected to link CEO pay
to firm performance, and prior literature shows that pay-for-performance schemes
are an important means to align CEO incentives with shareholder interests (e.g.,
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles, 1993). Since the 1990s,
the compensation of top executives has been criticized for being excessive and
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decoupled from firm performance. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) show that CEOs
have considerable influence over the Board of Directors, which enables them to
obtain favorable pay arrangements.
I hypothesize that the threat of derivative litigation motivates directors to align
with shareholders, which may lead the Board to resist a CEO’s compensation de-
mand and to impose pay-for-performance schemes. I expect that when Delaware’s
judicially-led reforms increased the likelihood of derivative litigation, Delaware
corporations exhibited higher sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance. My
first hypothesis is that:
Hypothesis 1 : Higher likelihood of derivative litigation leads to higher CEO
pay-for-performance sensitivity.
In addition, I examine the quality of the Board’s decisions on CEO replace-
ment. Effective boards are expected to remove under-performing management in
a timely manner. I argue that the threat of derivative litigation may motivate di-
rectors to perform the function of replacing poorly-performing CEOs, as they have
more incentives to develop a shareholder-friendly reputation. In the empirical lit-
erature, researchers measure the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance,
and use this measure to evaluate the quality of the Board’s decisions. I expect
that following the Delaware’s judicially-led reforms, Delaware firms exhibit greater
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Formally, I test the following
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2 : Higher likelihood of derivative litigation leads to greater CEO
turnover-performance sensitivity.
3.4. Data and Model Specification
My sample consists of 2153 publicly-traded firms from 1999 -2007. I obtain
data on CEO compensation from the ExecuComp database. ExecuComp contains
information on the top executives of firms in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and
S&P SmallCap indexes. CEO compensation is comprised of cash compensation
(salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts), total value of restricted stock
granted, total value of stock options (calculated using the Black-Scholes method),
and other long-term incentive payouts. Following Parrino (1997), CEO turnovers
are classified into forced and voluntary turnovers. I focus on forced CEO turnover,
which includes all departures for which the CEO is fired, forced from the position,
or departs due to policy differences. The data on CEO forced turnover are provided
by Jenter and Kanaan (2015).17 To construct turnover-performance sensitivity and
pay-for-performance sensitivity, I collect stock return data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I use firm 12-month stock returns adjusted
by value-weighted industry (3-digit SIC) returns. I also measure stock return
volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the previous 60-month stock returns.
17
I thank Dirk Jenter and Fadi Kanaan for providing CEO turnover data. Jenter and Kanaan (2015) use
ExecuComp database to identify the cases of CEO turnover, and then search Factiva news database to determine
whether the CEO turnover is forced or voluntary, as well as the exact turnover announcement date.
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CEO characteristics can affect Board of Director decisions on CEO compen-
sation and dismissal. Allen (1981) and Lambert et al. (1993) show that CEO
compensation is lower when the CEO has larger holdings of firm’s stock. Booth,
Cornett and Tehranian (2002) argue that concentrating management’s power and
board leadership in one person’s hands can exacerbate potential conflicts of inter-
est, decreasing the effectiveness of monitoring. I control for CEO characteristics,
such as CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and whether the CEO is also chairman
of the Board. Data on CEO characteristics are obtained from the ExecuComp
database.
I also control for Board and corporate governance characteristics. Prior lit-
erature shows that Board size and composition affect board effectiveness. For
example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) show that large boards
are associated with poor communication and decision making, and limiting the size
of the Board improves Board efficiency. Weisbach (1988) demonstrates that inside
and outside directors behave differently in monitoring CEOs. Outsider-dominated
boards are more likely to replace poorly-performing CEOs than insider-dominated
boards. Hallock (1997) shows that CEO compensation is higher at firms with in-
terlocked outside directors. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that when a majority
of board members serve on three or more outside boards, the sensitivity of CEO
turnover to performance is significantly lower. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show
that gender-diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Following these
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literature, I include variables such as Board size, Board independence, faction of
interlocking directors, average director’s outside board seats, fraction of female
directors, as control variables. I also include a governance index (G-index) to
proxy for the level of shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). I
obtain data on Board and corporate governance characteristics from the RiskMet-
rics database, which contains firms in the Standard & Poor’s 1500 index. I follow
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) to address the data problems with RiskMetrics.
Following prior literature, I also include firm characteristics as control variables,
such as firm assets, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, stock return volatility,
capital expenditure, and firm age. I obtain data on these firm characteristics from
the Compustat database. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1.
In Table 3.2, I present summary statistics for the main variables used in the
study. The CEO compensation variable is skewed, with median CEO pay being
$2.95 million, and mean CEO pay being $5.69 million. The variable of forced CEO
turnover is also skewed. In my sample period, I observe 538 forced turnovers out
of 16,101 firm-year observations.
98
T
ab
le
3.
1.
V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
efi
ni
ti
on
V
ar
ia
bl
es
D
efi
ni
ti
on
D
at
a
So
ur
ce
C
E
O
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
It
em
T
D
C
1
in
E
xe
cu
C
om
p.
C
E
O
to
ta
lc
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
is
co
m
pr
is
ed
of
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g:
Sa
la
ry
,B
on
us
,O
th
er
A
nn
ua
l,
To
ta
l
Va
lu
e
of
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
St
oc
k
G
ra
nt
ed
,T
ot
al
Va
lu
e
of
St
oc
k
O
pt
io
ns
G
ra
nt
ed
(u
si
ng
B
la
ck
-S
ch
ol
es
),
Lo
ng
-T
er
m
In
ce
nt
iv
e
Pa
yo
ut
s,
an
d
A
ll
O
th
er
To
ta
l.
E
xe
cu
C
om
p
C
E
O
Tu
rn
ov
er
A
n
in
di
ca
to
r
va
ri
ab
le
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
er
e
is
a
fo
rc
ed
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
in
fir
m
i
in
ye
ar
t,
an
d
eq
ua
lt
o
ze
ro
if
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
is
vo
lu
nt
ar
y
or
no
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
oc
cu
rs
.
T
he
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n
of
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
s
in
to
fo
rc
ed
an
d
vo
lu
nt
ar
y
is
ba
se
d
on
Pa
rr
in
o
(1
99
7)
.
Je
nt
er
an
d
K
an
aa
n
(2
01
5)
In
du
st
ry
-a
dj
us
te
d
St
oc
k
R
et
ur
n
A
fir
m
’s
st
oc
k
re
tu
rn
ad
ju
st
ed
by
th
e
va
lu
e-
w
ei
gh
te
d
in
du
st
ry
(3
-d
ig
it
SI
C
)
re
tu
rn
s,
co
m
po
un
de
d
ov
er
12
m
on
th
s.
In
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
th
e
12
-m
on
th
pe
ri
od
en
ds
on
e
m
on
th
be
fo
re
th
e
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t,
or
en
ds
at
th
e
en
d
of
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
if
th
er
e
is
no
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
.
In
C
E
O
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
th
e
12
-m
on
th
pe
ri
od
en
ds
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
e
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
.
C
en
te
r
fo
r
R
es
ea
rc
h
in
Se
cu
ri
ty
P
ri
ce
s
(C
R
SP
)
C
E
O
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
T
he
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
a
fir
m
’s
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
sh
ar
es
ow
ne
d
by
C
E
O
.
E
xe
cu
C
om
p
C
E
O
Te
nu
re
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
ye
ar
s
th
at
a
C
E
O
ho
ld
s
hi
s/
he
r
po
si
tio
n.
E
xe
cu
C
om
p
C
E
O
C
ha
ir
m
an
A
n
in
di
ca
to
r
va
ri
ab
le
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
a
fir
m
’s
C
E
O
is
al
so
th
e
ch
ai
rm
an
of
th
e
bo
ar
d,
an
d
eq
ua
lt
o
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
E
xe
cu
C
om
p
B
oa
rd
Si
ze
T
he
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
di
re
ct
or
s
on
a
fir
m
’s
bo
ar
d.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
Fr
ac
tio
n
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
D
ir
ec
to
rs
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
di
re
ct
or
s
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
di
re
ct
or
s.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
C
la
ss
ifi
ed
B
oa
rd
A
n
in
di
ca
to
r
va
ri
ab
le
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
a
fir
m
’s
bo
ar
d
is
cl
as
si
fie
d
bo
ar
d,
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
C
la
ss
ifi
ed
bo
ar
d
(a
ls
o
kn
ow
n
as
st
ag
ge
re
d
bo
ar
d)
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
bo
ar
d
of
di
re
ct
or
s
th
at
is
di
vi
de
d
in
to
se
pa
ra
te
cl
as
se
s
fo
r
th
e
pu
rp
os
e
of
el
ec
tio
n.
In
m
os
t
in
st
an
ce
s,
th
er
e
ar
e
th
re
e
cl
as
se
s,
w
ith
on
ly
on
e
cl
as
s
of
di
re
ct
or
s
st
an
d
fo
r
el
ec
tio
n
in
an
y
on
e
ye
ar
.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
A
ve
ra
ge
D
ir
ec
to
r
Te
nu
re
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
ye
ar
s
th
at
a
di
re
ct
or
se
rv
es
on
a
fir
m
’s
bo
ar
d,
av
er
ag
ed
ac
ro
ss
al
ld
ir
ec
to
rs
in
a
fir
m
.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
A
ve
ra
ge
D
ir
ec
to
r’
s
O
ut
si
de
B
oa
rd
Se
at
s
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
ou
ts
id
e
bo
ar
ds
th
at
a
di
re
ct
or
se
rv
es
,a
ve
ra
ge
d
ac
ro
ss
al
ld
ir
ec
to
rs
in
a
fir
m
.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
Fr
ac
tio
n
Fe
m
al
e
D
ir
ec
to
rs
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
fe
m
al
e
di
re
ct
or
s
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
di
re
ct
or
s.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
Fr
ac
tio
n
In
te
rl
oc
ki
ng
D
ir
ec
to
rs
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
in
te
rl
oc
ki
ng
di
re
ct
or
s
(a
di
re
ct
or
is
in
te
rl
oc
ke
d
if
an
in
si
de
offi
ce
r
of
th
e
fir
m
se
rv
es
on
th
e
bo
ar
d
of
th
at
ou
ts
id
e
di
re
ct
or
’s
co
m
pa
ny
),
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
di
re
ct
or
s.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
Fr
ac
tio
n
Fo
rm
er
E
m
pl
oy
ee
D
ir
ec
to
rs
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
di
re
ct
or
s
w
ho
ar
e
fo
rm
er
em
pl
oy
ee
s
of
th
e
fir
m
,d
iv
id
ed
by
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
di
re
ct
or
s.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
G
In
de
x
G
ov
er
na
nc
e
in
de
x
as
de
fin
ed
in
G
om
pe
rs
,I
sh
ii,
an
d
M
et
ri
ck
(2
00
3)
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
D
ua
lC
la
ss
Sh
ar
e
St
ru
ct
ur
e
A
n
in
di
ca
to
r
va
ri
ab
le
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
a
fir
m
’s
co
m
m
on
st
oc
k
ha
s
tw
o
or
m
or
e
cl
as
se
s,
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
D
ua
lc
la
ss
sh
ar
e
st
ru
ct
ur
e
ty
pi
ca
lly
gr
an
ts
su
pe
r
vo
tin
g
ri
gh
ts
to
on
e
cl
as
s
of
th
e
st
oc
k.
R
is
kM
et
ri
cs
Fi
rm
A
ss
et
s
Fi
rm
i’s
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(it
em
#
6)
C
om
pu
st
at
St
oc
k
R
et
ur
n
V
ol
at
ili
ty
T
he
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
on
th
ly
st
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
in
th
e
pa
st
60
m
on
th
s.
In
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
th
e
60
-m
on
th
pe
ri
od
en
ds
on
e
m
on
th
be
fo
re
th
e
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t,
or
en
ds
at
th
e
en
d
of
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
if
th
er
e
is
no
C
E
O
tu
rn
ov
er
.
In
C
E
O
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
th
e
60
-m
on
th
pe
ri
od
en
ds
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
e
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
.
C
en
te
r
fo
r
R
es
ea
rc
h
in
Se
cu
ri
ty
P
ri
ce
s
(C
R
SP
)
To
bi
n’
s
Q
Fi
rm
i’s
To
bi
n’
s
Q
is
co
m
pu
te
d
as
[m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
(it
em
#
19
9×
ite
rm
#
25
)
+
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
as
se
ts
(i
te
m
#
6)
−
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
(it
em
#
60
)
−b
al
an
ce
sh
ee
t
de
fe
rr
ed
ta
xe
s
(it
em
#
74
)]
/b
oo
k
va
lu
e
of
as
se
ts
(it
em
#
6)
C
om
pu
st
at
C
ap
E
xp
/
A
ss
et
s
C
ap
ita
le
xp
en
di
tu
re
(it
em
#
12
8)
di
vi
de
d
by
la
gg
ed
as
se
t
(it
em
#
6)
C
om
pu
st
at
In
st
itu
tio
na
lO
w
ne
rs
hi
p
T
he
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
fir
m
i’s
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
sh
ar
es
he
ld
by
in
st
itu
tio
na
li
nv
es
to
rs
.
T
ho
m
so
n
R
eu
te
rs
In
st
itu
tio
na
l(
13
f)
H
ol
di
ng
s
Fi
rm
A
ge
Fi
rm
i’s
ag
e
in
ye
ar
t,
ap
pr
ox
im
at
ed
by
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ye
ar
s
lis
te
d
on
C
om
pu
st
at
.
C
om
pu
st
at
99
Table 3.2
Summary Statistics
Variables 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Mean SD N
CEO Compensation (in Thousands) 516 1410 2953 6700 19169 5693 11602 12293
CEO Turnover 0 0 0 0 0 0.036 0.186 12608
Industry-adjusted Stock Return -0.527 -0.201 -0.022 0.181 0.773 0.040 0.502 12364
CEO Ownership 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.128 0.023 0.060 11950
CEO Tenure 0 2 5 9 22 6.890 7.241 12345
CEO Chairman 0 1 1 1 1 0.767 0.423 12364
Board Size 6 7 9 11 14 9.432 2.726 12364
Fraction Independent Directors 0.375 0.571 0.714 0.818 0.900 0.682 0.166 12364
Classified Board 0 0 1 1 1 0.601 0.490 11639
Average Director Tenure 3.111 5.778 8 10.692 16 8.926 22.317 12363
Average Director’s Outside Seats 0 0.364 0.727 1.182 1.929 0.823 0.605 12364
Fraction Female Directors 0 0 0.100 0.154 0.250 0.099 0.007 12364
Fraction Interlocking Directors 0 0 0 0 0.071 0.007 0.030 12364
Fraction Former Employee Directors 0 0 0 0.100 0.200 0.049 0.078 12364
G Index 5 7 9 11 14 9.313 2.610 10315
Dual Class Share Structure 0 0 0 0 1 0.090 0.287 11639
Firm Assets (in Millions) 210 682 1892 6635 43645 14781 75226 12363
Stock Return Volatility 0.055 0.083 0.108 0.151 0.241 0.124 0.062 12361
Tobin’s Q 0.852 1.179 1.604 2.529 5.811 2.364 3.635 12358
CapExp / Assets 0.002 0.020 0.040 0.072 0.181 0.059 0.067 11874
Institutional Ownership 0.347 0.570 0.718 0.840 0.920 0.724 2.439 12320
Firm Age 6 12 21 41 54 26.172 16.321 12363
I first compare the changes in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity from a pre-
event period (2000-2002) to a post-event period (2003-2005), between Delaware
firms and non-Delaware firms. I specify the following model:
COMPi,t = β0 + β1 ×RETi,t + β2 ×RETi,t ×DELAWAREi + β3 ×RETi,t × POSTt
+β4×DELAWAREi×POSTt+β5×RETi,t×DELAWAREi×POSTt+γXi,t+νi+µt+εi,t
(15)
Here, COMPi,t represents the CEO’s compensation at firm i in year t. I use nat-
ural logarithmic transformation of COMPi,t. RETi,t is firm i’s industry-adjusted
stock return in year t. DELAWAREi is an indicator variable that equals one if
firm i is incorporated in Delaware. POSTt is an indicator variable which takes
the value one if the observation occurs in the post-event period (2003-2005), and
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zero otherwise. Xit is a vector of firm-level controls, including CEO character-
istics, Board and governance characteristics, and firm characteristics. I include
firm fixed effects νi to control for unobserved heterogeneity. µt is year fixed ef-
fects. εi,t is an i.i.d. error term. The specification does not include the non-
interacted DELAWAREi and POSTt, because they are subsumed in the firm
and year fixed effects. In (1), β1 is the estimate of the sensitivity of CEO com-
pensation to changes in returns. The coefficient of main interest is β5, which mea-
sures the change in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity that can be attributed
to Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003. I estimate empirical model (1) using
the OLS estimator.
Similarly, to test whether the directors of Delaware corporations make more
timely CEO replacement decisions when firm stock price declines, I estimate the
following model:
Prob (TURNOV ERi,t) = β0+β1×RETi,t+β2×RETi,t×DELAWAREi+β3×RETi,t×POSTt
+β4×DELAWAREi×POSTt+β5×RETi,t×DELAWAREi×POSTt+γXi,t+νi+µt+εi,t
(16)
Here, TURNOV ERi,t+1 is an indicator variable which takes the value one if
there is a forced CEO turnover at firm i in year t, and zero otherwise. The coeffi-
cient of interest is β5, which is a DiD estimate of the effect of the Delaware’s 2003
jurisprudential shift on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm stock performance.
Empirical model (2) is estimated using the Linear Probability Model (LPM).
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3.5. Empirical Results
3.5.1. Baseline Model
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.3. Column (1) shows the effect of
Delaware’s judicially-led reforms on the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm
performance. The OLS regression excludes the firm-year observations in which
a firm experiences CEO turnover. The reason is that ExecuComp reports the
compensation of either new CEO or replaced CEO in the turnover year, in which
case the compensation data are not what the CEO normally receives in the years
with no turnover. For most firms, the CEO total compensation reported in Execu-
Comp is lower in CEO turnover years than in other years. The coefficient on the
interaction term Stock Return × Delaware × Post in column (1) is positive and sta-
tistically significant (0.317). This suggests that following the Delaware’s reforms,
CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity increased significantly. When a firm’s annual
industry-adjusted stock returns improve (decline) by one unit, Delaware firms in-
crease (decrease) CEO annual compensation by 31.7% more than non-Delaware
firms do. In column (2), I report the estimated effects on forced CEO turnover. I
find that the Delaware’s judicially-led reforms lead to greater sensitivity of CEO
turnover in response to change in a firm’s stock performance. The probability of
replacing a CEO when firm stock performance declines is significantly higher in
Delaware firms than in non-Delaware firms. This effect is indicated by the neg-
ative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term Stock Return
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Table 3.3: The Effects of Delaware’s Judicially-led Reforms in 2003 on Board
Effectiveness
CEO Compensation CEO Turnover
OLS Model LPM Model
Variables (1) (2)
Stock Return 0.077**a -0.022***
(0.032)b (0.008)
Stock Return × Delaware × Post 0.317*** -0.077***
(0.091) (0.029)
Stock Return × Delaware -0.106** -0.001
(0.042) (0.011)
Stock Return × Post -0.215*** 0.010
(0.070) (0.023)
Delaware × Post 0.032 0.014
(0.037) (0.010)
CEO Ownership -1.972*** -0.424***
(0.451) (0.124)
CEO Tenure 0.035 0.052***
(0.022) (0.006)
CEO Chairman -0.016 -0.014
(0.037) (0.011)
Board Size 0.152 -0.012
(0.106) (0.031)
Fraction Independent Directors -0.141 0.040
(0.121) (0.032)
Classified Board 0.180* 0.001
(0.094) (0.026)
Average Director Tenure -0.056 -0.014
(0.058) (0.019)
Average Director’s Outside Board Seats 0.007 0.011
(0.037) (0.010)
Fraction Female Directors 0.282 0.023
(0.228) (0.072)
Fraction Interlocking Directors 0.203 -0.062
(0.453) (0.135)
Fraction Former Employee Directors -0.507** 0.215***
(0.226) (0.061)
G Index 0.027 -0.049
(0.155) (0.039)
Dual Class Share Structure 0.027 0.012
(0.116) (0.026)
Firm Assets 0.390*** -0.038***
(0.046) (0.014)
Stock Return Volatility 1.031* 0.156
(0.579) (0.188)
Tobin’s Q 0.033*** -0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
CapExp / Assets 0.559** -0.102
(0.282) (0.080)
Institutional Ownership 0.674*** -0.190***
(0.156) (0.050)
Firm Age -0.165 0.006
(0.189) (0.055)
Constant 4.917*** 0.382
(1.207) (0.351)
Year FE, Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 6228 7353
Adjusted R2 0.727 0.083
a ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
b Robust standard errors of the estimate.
103
× Delaware × Post (-0.077).
A key identifying assumption of DiD is the “parallel trend” assumption. In the
absence of the treatment, the average change in CEO pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity and turnover-performance sensitivity would be no different across Delaware
and non-Delaware firms. To assess the validity of this key identifying assump-
tion, I follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). I investigate in greater de-
tail the dynamic effects of Delaware’s 2003 reforms on the sensitivities of CEO
compensation and dismissals to firm performance. I replace the interaction term
RETi,t×DELAWAREi×POSTt in equations (1) and (2) with the interaction of
RETi,t×DELAWAREi with eight time indicators. Those time variables include:
Before (-4), Before (-3), Before (-2), and Before (-1) are the dummy variables
that equal one if the firm-year observation is before the Delaware court decision (4
years before, 3 years before, 2 years before, and 1 year before, respectively), and
zero otherwise; After (+1), After (+2), After (+3) and After (+4) are dummy
variables equal to one if the firm-year observation is during or after the shift (1
year after, 2 years after, 3 years after, and 4 years after, respectively), and zero
otherwise. In addition, RETi,t × POSTt in equations (1) and (2) is replaced with
interactions ofRETi,t with the above time indicators, andDELAWAREi×POSTt
is replaced with interactions of DELAWAREi with time indicators.
As shown in Table 3.4, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms Stock
Return × Delaware × Before (-3), Stock Return × Delaware × Before (-2) , and
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Table 3.4: Dynamic Analysis of the Effects of Delaware’s 2003 Judicially-led
Reforms
Treatment firms are the U. S. publicly-traded firms incorporated in Delaware. Control firms are the
U. S. publicly-traded firms incorporated in other states. Before (-4), Before (-3), Before (-2), and
Before (-1) are the dummy variables that equal one if the firm-year observation is before Delaware’s
jurisprudential shift. After (+1), After (+2), After (+3) and After (+4) are dummy variables equal
to one if the firm-year observation is during or after the shift. In all regressions, I include (1) the
interaction of RETi,t × DELAWAREi with the above time indicators; (2) the interaction of RETi,t
with the above time indicators (not reported on the table); and (3) the interaction of DELAWAREi
with time indicators (not reported on the table). The omitted group (benchmark) is the observations
at Before (-4).
CEO Compensation CEO Turnover
OLS Model LPM Model
Variables (1) (2)
Stock Return -0.104 -0.022
(0.069) (0.018)
Stock Return × Delaware × Before (-3) -0.087 0.019
(0.109) (0.028)
Stock Return × Delaware × Before (-2) -0.051 -0.039
(0.103) (0.026)
Stock Return × Delaware × Before (-1) -0.156 -0.002
(0.134) (0.038)
Stock Return × Delaware × After (+1) -0.107 -0.126**
(0.146) (0.058)
Stock Return × Delaware × After (+2) 0.361** a -0.064
(0.158) b (0.042)
Stock Return × Delaware × After (+3) 0.207 -0.075*
(0.170) (0.040)
Stock Return × Delaware × After (+4) -0.199 -0.056
(0.200) (0.070)
Stock Return × Delaware 0.014 0.013
(0.078) (0.020)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year FE, Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 8298 9833
Adjusted R2 0.716 0.067
a ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
b Robust standard errors of the estimate.
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Stock Return × Delaware × Before (-1) are statistically indistinguishable from
zero. These results suggest that the Delaware and non-Delaware firms have simi-
lar trends in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity prior to the Delaware court decision. The estimate in column (1) shows
that the effect of Delaware’s reforms on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity ap-
pears two years after the Delaware court decision that increased shareholder liti-
gation power. The estimate in column (2) shows that a significant change in CEO
turnover-performance sensitivity occurs one year after the court decision. The
reforms provide stronger immediate incentives for boards of directors to replace
under-performing CEOs.
I observe that Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003 have a stronger effect
on board monitoring effectiveness during the early period than during the later
period. As discussed in previous sections, Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003
were a response to the preemptive threat of federal legislature. As the federal
threat receded over time, Delaware courts relaxed the tough fiduciary standard
that judges had imposed through earlier decisions (Jones, 2011). This explains the
decline in the effect of the Delaware’s reforms on director incentives to monitor
CEOs. In addition, Delaware has a prominent role in the development of corporate
law. Given Delaware court expertise in complex corporate litigation, other state
courts often follow Delaware’s lead. So, after Delaware courts imposed stricter
fiduciary standards for directors and officers, the courts of the other jurisdiction
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Table 3.5: Placebo Tests
Columns (1) and (3) report the difference-in-differences estimates using placebo event in 2001. Columns
(2) and (4) report the difference-in-differences estimates using placebo event in 2005. All regressions
include control variables as in Table 3.3.
CEO Compensation CEO Turnover
OLS Model LPM Model
1999-2002 2003-2006 1999-2002 2003-2006
Placebo event in
2001
Placebo event in
2005
Placebo event in
2001
Placebo event in
2005
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock Return -0.077 -0.050 -0.033** -0.025
(0.053) (0.064) (0.014) (0.026)
Stock Return × Delaware ×
PostPlacebo
-0.017 -0.041 -0.020 -0.009
(0.093) (0.133) (0.028) (0.051)
Stock Return × Delaware 0.002 -0.024 0.013 -0.032
(0.059) (0.085) (0.016) (0.033)
Stock Return × PostPlacebo 0.174** 0.210** 0.026 0.022
(0.071) (0.101) (0.017) (0.038)
Delaware × PostPlacebo -0.090* -0.023 -0.002 0.009
(0.053) (0.036) (0.013) (0.011)
Constant 5.185*** 5.884*** 0.967*** 0.313
(1.860) (1.305) (0.314) (0.444)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE, Industry FE, Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3982 4316 4783 5044
Adjusted R2 0.707 0.784 0.082 0.095
a ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
b Robust standard errors of the estimate.
may follow. As a result, I observe that the effect of the Delaware’s reforms on
board monitoring effectiveness is most prominent in the first two years following
the reforms.
I conduct placebo tests to further support my identification strategy. I shift
the date of Delaware’s judicially-led reforms two years backwards (i.e., starting
in 2001) and forwards (i.e., starting in 2005). Then I replicate the difference-in-
differences analysis for each placebo event. For the placebo event in 2001, I use
data from 1999 to 2002. Similarly, for the placebo event in 2005, I utilize the
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data from 2003-2006. If our identification strategy is valid, I would not expect
to observe significant treatment effects for these placebo events. In Table 3.5,
I report the results from these placebo tests. Using the placebo event in 2001,
the coefficients on the interaction term Stock Return × Delaware × PostPlacebo
(-0.017 and -0.020) are statistically insignificant. This suggests that there is no dif-
ferential change in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, or turnover-performance
sensitivity between Delaware and non-Delaware firms prior to Delaware’s 2003 re-
forms. Also, this result provides evidence that the “parallel trends” assumption
is satisfied. In columns (2) and (4) I report the placebo tests using placebo event
in 2005. The estimated coefficients on Stock Return × Delaware × PostPlacebo
are both small and statistically insignificant. These placebo tests support our
assertion that the documented differential change in CEO pay-for-performance
and turnover-performance sensitivities (as in Table 3.3) are attributable to the
Delaware judicial decisions in 2003, and they are not some artifact of the estima-
tion procedure.
3.5.2. Propensity Score Matching
An alternative explanation for these effects is that firm characteristics deter-
mine the endogenous choice concerning the state of incorporation, and these firm
characteristics lead to differential trends in the sensitivities of CEO compensa-
tion and turnover to firm stock returns after the Delaware reforms. To address
this concern, I use propensity score matching to control for the difference in firm
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Table 3.6: Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-Differences Estimation
In column (1) of Panel A, I present parameter estimates from a probit regression of a binary variable
indicating whether a firm is incorporated in Delaware on important firm characteristics. Using the
estimated propensity score, I perform a nearest-neighbor match, where control firms are drawn with
replacement. In column (2) of Panel A I report parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using
the sample of matched treatment-control pairs. Panel B reports the difference-in-differences estimates of
the effect of Delaware’s judicially-led reforms in 2003 on board effectiveness using the propensity score
matching sample.
Panel A: Comparison of pre-matching and post-matching samples, probit regressions
Pre - Matching Post - Matching
Dependent Variable Delaware Delaware
(1) (2)
CEO Ownership 0.023 -0.040
(0.764) (0.777)
CEO Tenure -0.078 -0.014
(0.050) (0.044)
CEO Chairman 0.144 -0.012
(0.108) (0.097)
Board Size -0.503** a -0.120
(0.214) b (0.194)
Fraction Independent Directors -0.312 0.259
(0.300) (0.267)
Classified Board 0.168* 0.076
(0.093) (0.083)
Average Director Tenure -0.465*** 0.049
(0.116) (0.098)
Average Director’s Outside Board Seats 0.080 -0.039
(0.075) (0.065)
Fraction Female Directors -1.144** -0.500
(0.477) (0.422)
Fraction Interlocking Directors -1.781 -0.079
(1.365) (1.364)
Fraction Former Employee Directors 0.694 0.713
(0.546) (0.484)
G Index -0.644*** 0.020
(0.190) (0.156)
Dual Class Share Structure 0.240* 0.104
(0.141) (0.119)
Firm Assets 0.145*** 0.038
(0.034) (0.030)
Stock Return -0.103 0.050
(0.096) (0.087)
Stock Return Volatility 0.915 -0.068
(0.762) (0.654)
Tobin’s Q 0.020 0.004
(0.030) (0.028)
CapExp / Assets -0.660 0.184
(0.707) (0.716)
Institutional Ownership 0.890*** -0.354*
(0.242) (0.211)
Firm Age -0.204** -0.065
(0.079) (0.069)
Constant 2.807*** 0.128
(0.723) (0.614)
Observations 1211 1430
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.006
a ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
b Robust standard errors of the estimate.
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Table 3.6, Panel B. Difference-in Difference Estimation Using Propensity Score Matching Sample
Dependent Variable CEO Compensation CEO Turnover
Model OLS LPM
(1) (2)
Stock Return 0.073*** a -0.043***
(0.027) b (0.009)
Stock Return × Delaware × Post 0.336*** -0.086***
(0.081) (0.027)
Stock Return × Delaware -0.097** 0.020
(0.040) (0.012)
Stock Return × Post -0.254*** 0.014
(0.050) (0.021)
Delaware × Post 0.063* 0.022**
(0.036) (0.009)
CEO Ownership -2.833*** -0.528***
(0.558) (0.124)
CEO Tenure 0.040* 0.053***
(0.022) (0.006)
CEO Chairman -0.056 -0.020*
(0.038) (0.011)
Board Size 0.047 0.013
(0.111) (0.029)
Fraction Independent Directors -0.227* 0.0123
(0.118) (0.027)
Classified Board 0.181* 0.002
(0.094) (0.026)
Average Director Tenure -0.054 -0.014
(0.059) (0.019)
Average Director’s Outside Board Seats 0.022 0.023***
(0.036) (0.009)
Fraction Female Directors 0.204 0.065
(0.226) (0.065)
Fraction Interlocking Directors 2.291*** -0.055
(0.461) (0.124)
Fraction Former Employee Directors -1.235*** 0.207***
(0.227) (0.056)
G Index 0.347** -0.133***
(0.162) (0.040)
Dual Class Share Structure 0.0517 -0.002
(0.131) (0.015)
Firm Assets 0.336*** -0.011
(0.046) (0.012)
Stock Return Volatility 2.472*** 0.042
(0.565) (0.159)
Tobin’s Q 0.029*** -0.002*
(0.007) (0.001)
CapExp / Assets 0.560* -0.048
(0.316) (0.070)
Institutional Ownership 0.669*** -0.141***
(0.151) (0.044)
Firm Age 0.060 0.023
(0.189) (0.049)
Constant 3.300** 0.286
(1.345) (0.287)
Year FE, Industry FE, Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 6222 7419
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.152
a ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
b Robust standard errors of the estimate.
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characteristics that affects the assignment into treatment and control groups. The
matching begins with a probit regression of a binary variable indicating whether a
firm is incorporated in Delaware on important firm characteristics. I include firm
characteristics identified by the previous literature to be the predictors of Delaware
incorporation and the firm characteristics that may affect CEO compensation and
dismissals. I measure these firm characteristics in 2002.
In Panel A of Table 3.6, I report the results of the probit regression. As
reported in column (1), the specification captures a significant amount of variation
in the firm choice to incorporate in Delaware, as indicated by a pseudo-R2 of
0.097 and p-value below 0.001. I use the predicted probability from the probit
estimation (the propensity score), to perform a nearest-neighbor match, where
control firms are drawn with replacement. In column (2), I illustrate that after
matching, the majority of differences in firm characteristics between treatment and
control firms have been removed. The pseudo-R2 of the probit regression using
the post-matching sample is 0.006, which is significantly smaller than that of the
pre-matching sample.
In Panel B of Table 3.6, I report the difference-in-differences estimation re-
sults based on the propensity score matching sample. I find that following the
Delaware court decisions, treatment firms exhibit significantly higher CEO pay-
for-performance sensitivity and higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. In
column (1), the estimated treatment effect on CEO pay-for-performance sensitiv-
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ity is 0.336, with statistical significance at the 1% level. Similarly, in column (2)
the estimated treatment effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is -0.086,
which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
In an untabulated analysis, I conduct placebo tests and dynamic analysis. The
test results using propensity score matching sample are similar to those of baseline
results using all Delaware and non-Delaware firms. Overall, the findings provide
evidence that enhancing shareholder litigation rights has an important impact on
board of director governance decisions.
3.5.3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Board Independence
Finally, I examine possible confounding effects associated with passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. A primary objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002 is to increase the independence of public company boards. Under the Act,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted rules that require com-
panies listed on NYSE and NASDAQ to have a Board made up of a majority
of independent directors. Prior literature shows that Board independence is an
important factor affecting Board effectiveness. It is possible that following the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Delaware firms and non-Delaware firms changed differen-
tially in Board independence. If this is true, the documented effects of Delaware’s
judicially-led reforms in 2003 on board monitoring effectiveness might be driven
by a change in Board independence. I test whether there is a significant change
in Board independence between Delaware and non-Delaware firms following the
112
Table 3.7: Test for the Confounding Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In column (1) I report the result of using the baseline sample, and in column (2) I report the result for
the propensity score matching sample.
Baseline Sample (All firms) Propensity Score Matching Sample
Fraction Independent Directors Fraction Independent Directors
OLS Model OLS Model
Variables (1) (2)
Delaware -0.015***a -0.000
(0.005)b (0.004)
Post 0.036*** 0.039***
(0.005) (0.004)
Delaware × Post 0.007 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.659*** 0.619***
(0.027) (0.027)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Observations 7082 7182
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.404
a ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
b Robust standard errors of the estimate.
reforms in Delaware. I conduct a difference-in-differences test using board inde-
pendence as the dependent variable.
In Table 3.7, I present the estimation results. In column (1) I report the result
for the baseline sample, where all Delaware and non-Delaware firms are included.
In column (2), I report the result for the propensity score matching sample. For
both samples, the coefficients on the term Post are positive and statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that both Delaware and non-Delaware firms improved board
independence in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Importantly, the coeffi-
cients on the interaction term Delaware×Post are statistically indistinguishable
from zero. This implies that Board independence changed in a similar pattern
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for Delaware and non-Delaware firms. Overall, the test shows that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was unlikely to drive the results reported in my analysis, and it supports
my view that Delaware’s judicially-led reforms led to an improvement in Board
effectiveness.
3.6. Conclusion
Economics and finance scholars examine how shareholders exert influence or
control over corporate governance. Corporate law in the United States grants
shareholders litigation rights. An important question is how shareholder litigation
rights affect corporate governance. In this study, I examine Delaware’s judicially-
led reforms in 2003, which I argue empowered shareholders to pursue derivative
litigation.
I find that following the reforms, there is evidence that boards of directors have
more incentives to perform their monitoring function, and they make more effective
corporate governance decisions. I document that CEO compensation and CEO
turnovers in Delaware firms become more sensitive to stock return performance.
Overall, these results show that empowering shareholders to pursue derivative
litigation and enforcing officer and director fiduciary duties can have economically
important impacts on corporate governance.
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